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SHELL OIL CO. V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA: THE STICKY
BUSINESS OF SETTING OIL PIPELINE




On December 1, 1981 a Long Beach pipeline exploded, injuring four
people and destroying nine homes.' Neighborhood activists, fearing sim-
ilar mishaps in their own cities, pressed for reforms of state and federal
laws governing the use of underground pipelines.2 It was at this time
that a long term lease agreement between Shell Oil Company and the
City of Santa Monica permitting the use of oil pipelines running beneath
city streets, expired.3 City officials refused to renew the agreement unless
Shell paid a higher fee and complied with additional safety regulations.4
Instead of meeting the city's demands, Shell brought suit seeking a decla-
ration: (1) that the commerce clause of the federal Constitution limited
the franchise fee payable to Santa Monica to an amount no greater than
the value of actual services provided by the City and; (2) that any
franchise terms regulating safety were preempted by federal law.5 In
Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica,6 Federal District Court Judge Rob-
ert Kelleher ruled against Shell on the first issue, concluding that because
the city was acting as a market participant in a private market, com-
1. Rainey, Refinery Cities Welcome Pipeline Fees Ruling, L.A. Daily J., July 14, 1986,
§ 2, at 1, col. 5. Contrary to the sensationalism generated by news reports describing pipeline
explosions, pipelines are actually the safest means of transportation in the United States: "Of
the major transport modes-automobile, bus, truck, railroad, water and air, pipelines have the
best record of safe operation." CAL. LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, REPORT ON UNDERGROUND PIPELINES IN CALIFORNIA 84 Supplemental
Testimony (c) (Oct. 18, 1972).
2. Rainey, Refinery Cities Welcome Pipeline Fees Ruling, L.A. Daily J., July 14, 1986,
§ 2, at 1, col. 5; see generally Bradley Opposes Oil Pipeline, Says City's Position Will Kill the
Project, L.A. Times, July 11, 1987, Pt. I (Front Page), at 33, col. I (Mayor opposed planned
crude oil pipeline); Bradley Will Oppose Plan for Oil Pipeline, L.A. Times, July 10, 1987, Pt. II
(Metro Section), at 1, col. I (Mayor opposed planned $225 million crude oil pipeline that
would run beneath 13 cities, including parts of Glendale, Burbank and Los Angeles); Pockets
of Methane Gas Identified in 6 Areas of Southland, L.A. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, Pt. II (Metro
Section), at 1, col. 5 (potentially explosive gas found beneath city buildings).
3. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, No. CV 82-2362, at 1 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2.
6. No. CV 82-2362 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986).
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merce clause restrictions did not apply to the city's franchise fee.7 Fur-
ther, even if these restrictions did apply, the increased fee would be
permissible under current law.8
This Note examines the possible limitations the dormant commerce
clause imposes -upon the city's franchise fee. Two major dormant com-
merce clause areas are discussed. First, the general history of the market
participant doctrine is outlined, followed by a discussion of the doctrine's
applicability to the'facts in Shell. Second, the line of tax decisions deal-
ing with the dormant commerce clause is set forth. Santa Monica's
franchise fee is then analyzed in terms of the most recent of these tax
cases. Finally, this Note concludes by suggesting a possible legislative
solution to the oil pipeline franchise fee problem.
II. SHELL OIL CO. V CITY OF SANTA MONICA
A. Facts of the Case
In 1941, Shell Oil Company signed a forty-year franchise agreement
with the City of Santa Monica, which allowed Shell to install and operate
an underground pipeline beneath city streets.9 The pipeline was ten in-
ches in diameter, 3.9 miles in length and part of an 82.2 mile network
used by Shell to transport crude oil from Ventura County to its Wilming-
ton refinery in Los Angeles County.'I The franchise came up for renewal
in 198111 at which time Santa Monica proposed two changes in the terms
of the agreement: (1) an increase in the annual rent from $1000 per mile
to $59,000 per mhile; 12 and (2) incorporation of seven pages of detailed
7. Id. at 4-8.
8. Id. at 8-13.
9. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, No. CV 82-2362, at I (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986).
10. Id.
11. Id. In late 1980 and early 1981, before expiration of the original franchise, Shell and
the City of Santa Monica began negotiating a franchise renewal. The City rejected Shell's offer
of annual rental of approximately $8500 as inadequate. The parties then agreed to suspend
negotiations to wait for independent appraisals of the value of the franchise and safety studies,
An interim operating agreement was executed which was still in effect when Appellee's An-
swering Brief was filed on January 14, 1987. Appellee's Answering Brief at 5, Shell Oil Co. v.
City of Santa Monica, No. 86-6103, No. 86-6206 (9th Cir. 1987).
12. No. CV 82-2362 at 1-2. If every section of the 82.2 mile pipeline was charged at the
$59,000 per mile rate, the fees for the entire pipeline would cost Shell $4,849,800. Possibly,
pipelines in other areas could also be subject to vastly increased rental fees. The City of Tor-
rance hiked its pipeline franchise fees two years ago and recently the Los Angeles City Council
enacted the highest pipeline franchise fee in southern California. Torrance City Attorney
Stanley Remelmeyer feels that "the Los Angeles action will likely result in increased franchise
fees countywide in the future." L.A. Council Doubles Fees on Oil Pipelines, The Evening Out-
look (Santa Monica, Cal.), July 16, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
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safety standards regulating the pipeline. 3
Shell filed suit in 1982, asserting that the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution prohibited the rent increase and preempted Santa
Monica's proposed safety terms. 4 Federal District Court Judge Robert
Kelleher upheld the increase in the rental rate against challenge under
both the commerce clause of the federal Constitution 5 and similar provi-
sions in the California Constitution. 16 However, the court determined
that Santa Monica could not impose additional safety terms because the
provisions of the Federal Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act
(FHLPSA) preempted any local safety regulations.17 Judge Kelleher's
decision in Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica is presently on appeal in
the Ninth Circuit.
18
. Reasoning of the Court
1. Market participant doctrine: monopoly limitation
In Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 9 the federal district court
held that the increased rental rate for the oil pipeline was exempt from all
scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause because the City of Santa
Monica was acting as a market participant in an essentially private mar-
ket.20  A state or its subdivision, however, does not come within the
13. No. CV 82-2362 at 1-2.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 18.
17. Id. at 21. Although this Note does not discuss at length the safety regulations preemp-
tion issue in Shell, a brief explanation of what preemption is in this context may be helpful. A
federal preemption issue arises whenever a state law seemingly conflicts with a federal law.
Courts use a three-step analysis to decide the preemption question:
1. Is the federal lav constitutional? If not, the state law will prevail, unless it is also
unconstitutional.
2. Do the federal and state laws conflict?
A. Is there an express conflict?
B. Is there an implied conflict?
3. If a conflict exists, the supremacy clause of art. VI, section 2 of the federal Constitu-
tion declares that the federal law overrides or preempts the state law. See L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-23 to 6-27 (1978).
18. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 86-6103, No. 86-6206 (9th Cir. 1987). Oral
arguments took place in the spring of 1987.
19. No. CV 82-2362 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986).
20. Santa Monica argued that the market participant doctrine extended to cases, such as
the one at issue here, involving real property. Appellee's Answering Brief supra note 11, at 15.
See Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984) (market partici-
pant doctrine applied to city-owned land fill); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473
A.2d 12 (1984) (county-owned dump sites exempt from commerce clause); Marine Park Boats,
Inc. v. Halberg, 598 Misc. 2d 938, 297 N.Y.S. 2d 236, 240, aff'd, 33 App. Div. 2d 932, 306
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scope of the market participant exception, and is therefore subject to
commerce clause analysis where it holds a "complete monopoly" over
the relevant market.2 '
Judge Kelleher, distinguishing the facts in Shell from those in West-
ern Oil & Gas Association v. Cory,22 concluded that Santa Monica did not
have a "complete monopoly" comparable to the one possessed by the
state of California in Cory.23 In Cory, the state of California controlled
all of the California coastline stretching from Mexico to Oregon.24 The
extreme hardship an oil company faced trying to transport oil around
this 1200 mile coastline25 led the court in Cory to rule that California's
ownership of its coastline constituted a monopoly.26 In contrast, Santa
Monica's land in Shell was not the only reasonable means of access to the
desired destination. In fact, Shell conceded the existence of a number of
alternative means of transporting oil to its Wilmington refinery.27 More-
over, Santa Monica's land did not enjoy a strategic geographic signifi-
N.Y.S. 2d 656 (1969) (court rejected commerce clause challenge to rental increase for city-
owned wharves).
21. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S.
81 (1985) (4-4 decision).
22. 726 F.2d 1340.
23. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 8.
24. 726 F.2d at 1341.
25. "California spans the Pacific seaboard between the 32nd and 42nd parallels, a distance
of 1,200 miles including coastal indentations." A. ROLLE, J. GAINES, THE GOLDEN STATE:
A HisTORY OF CALIFORNIA 1 (1979).
26. Cory, 726 F.2d at 1343.
27. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 5. In Transcontinental Gas Pipe line Corp. v. Milltown, 93
F. Supp. 287 (D.N.J. 1950), the court countered Milltown's argument that the pipeline could
be built elsewhere by stating:
It is clear therefore that defendant municipality's zoning ordinance promulgated
under the police power of the state can be sustained only if it is reasonable and justifi-
able and does not create an undue burden on interstate commerce....
The defendant stands only upon the suggestion of its mayor that other routes are
available, which is corroborated by another witness.... The only efficacy of this
testimony rests in the statements that the pipe line could be otherwise routed. This is
almost axiomatic for as one of the defendant's witnesses on cross examination admit-
ted a pipeline can be laid practically anywhere, including the side of the Empire State
Building if expense is of no consideration.
On the other hand the plaintiff has shown logical, efficient and economical rea-
sons for following the right-of-way of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company
in this particular congested industrial portion of this state. By doing so it insures a
minimum of inconvenience to, and destruction of property of, others.
[ T]he mere claim by defendant that its ordinance requires plaintiff to locate
its pipe line in an alternative route, suggested as available, does not fortify it with
power to impede the plaintiff in the prosecution of its legal objective in the field of
interstate commerce. Such an attempt to obstruct interstate commerce under guise
of an assertion of exercise of the police power must fail.
Id. at 294-95.
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cance tantamount to that of the California coastline and, therefore, the
market participant doctrine shielded the city's actions from dormant
commerce clause analysis.28 Because Santa Monica fell within the mar-
ket participant exception to dormant commerce clause scrutiny, it could
set a franchise fee for Shell's oil pipeline free of commerce clause
restrictions.29
2. Survival of Santa Monica's franchise fee under dormant commerce
clause scrutiny
The Shell court further reasoned that even if Santa Monica had held
a monopoly over the oil company's access to its Wilmington plant and
was subject to commerce clause scrutiny, the new franchise fee would
still be valid because it was" 'not graduated by the amount of business,
nor... fixed for the privilege of doing business.' "30 If a fee or tax meas-
ures use, the commerce clause requires that the fee be calculated by a
formula which measures actual use.31 But, according to Judge Kelleher,
a levy such as Santa Monica's franchise fee, which was not designed to
meter use, did not violate the commerce clause.32
In Shell, the court compared the flat franchise fee imposed by Santa
Monica to the percentage fee in Western Oil & Gas Association v. Gory.3 3
In Cory, the state of California, acting under California Administrative
28. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 5. It is interesting to note that the major oil companies
themselves have been accused of possessing a "natural monopoly" over pipelines in California:
The usual method of moving crude oil from the fields to shipping ports and
refineries is large pipelines. Pipelines are expensive to build. An independent pro-
ducer can rarely build pipelines to market his production, and an independent refiner
can rarely build pipelines to many or all of his sources of supplies. This leaves both
producers and refiners at the mercy of those who own the existing pipelines, usually
the major integrated oil companies. Exchange agreements are frequently entered
into in California, but the owner of the pipeline can bargain from an unfair bargain-
ing position.
REPORT OF THE CAL. ATT'Y GEN. TASK FORCE ON ENERGY at 8-9 (May 1974); see generally
L. COOKENBOO, CRUDE OIL PIPELINES AND COMPETITION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY (1955).
29. See infra notes 54-98 and accompanying text for a history of the Supreme Court's
market participant cases.
30. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 8 (quoting Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340,
1344 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (4-4 decision)).
31. Id. at 9. Fees which compensate the government for the use of government services or
facilities are termed "user fees." The primary question in "user fee" cases has not been
whether the government deserves compensation, but rather what formula will be used to arrive
at the proper level of compensation. Judge Kelleher's emphasis in Shell on charging only for
actual use in a "user" fee situation reflects this judicial concern for an equitable calculation.
See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972); Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937).
32. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 12-13.
33. Id. at 8-9. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340, 1341-42 (9th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (4-4 decision).
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Code section 2005, 34 set a rental charge comprised of two parts: (1) a
minimum annual rent of eight percent of the appraised value of the
leased land and; (2) an additional charge based on the volume of com-
modities passing over the leased land.35 The second part of the levy,
based on the volume of oil passing through the pipeline, was a classic
user fee. Because this fee was calculated using a determinable value-
volume-the court was able to ascertain whether the fee paid by the oil
company was reasonably related to the extent to which it utilized city
services. 36 Reasoning in this manner, the court struck down the volu-
metric rate after it was found to be disproportionate to the benefits con-
ferred by the state.37
Conversely, the first part of the state's fee in Cory, based upon a
percentage of the appraised value of the land over which oil was trans-
ported,38 did not measure actual use of the pipelines, and so could not
vary with the amount of oil delivered. Therefore, because the percentage
fee's relationship to city-provided services could not be accurately
gauged, the court could not strike down the fee based on disproportional-
ity.39 The court's decision reflected judicial policy supporting abstention
in cases where the court does not have the competence nor the resources
to determine the constitutionality of a fee which is related to services
which cannot be measured with reasonable certainty.4"
Although not clear from the text of the Shell opinion, Judge Kelle-
her also may have accepted Santa Monica's argument that the franchise
fee was akin to a real estate lease fee. Santa Monica conceded that it
could not properly tax the company for the transportation of oil without
demonstrating some measurable relationship between the tax and the
services provided.4 Instead, Santa Monica argued that the franchise fee
34. Cory, 726 F.2d at 1341. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 2005 (19xx) as anendcd by
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 2003 (1981).
35. Cory, 726 F.2d at 1342.
36. The city service involved in Shell was use of city-controlled property through which to
lay and operate a pipeline. Conceptually, a fixed franchise fee based upon the value of an
easement through city-controlled property closely resembles the percentage fee in Cory. Ar-
guably, the franchise fee in Shell should be upheld as was the percentage fee in Cory.
37. 726 F.2d at 1344.
38. Id. at 1341.
39. Id. at 1344.
40. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 11; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 627-28 (1981) (state-severance tax on coal upheld against commerce clause attack).
41. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 12. Had the flow of oil itself been the measure of the levy a
classic "user fee" situation would have existed. This occurs when a taxed item of commerce
merely passes through the jurisdiction of the taxing body. In a typical "user fee" situation, the
goods being charged for are within the taxing entity's jurisdiction for only a short time and,
therefore, to avoid undue burden on interstate commerce, the relationship between the tax and
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was a leasehold fee for the physical occupation of space by the pipeline.42
Santa Monica stated that the oil passing through the pipeline was not
taxed at all.43 If the oil itself was not taxed, any relationship between the
amount of oil passing through the pipeline and Santa Monica's fee would
be irrelevant for commerce clause tax analysis; this relationship could
not subsequently provide the basis for striking down the franchise fee.
III. MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE
A. Background
1. Development of the dormant commerce clause
The federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce is
derived from article one, section eight of the United States Constitution
which provides that "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."'  This
clause can be used in two ways. First, Congress may affirmatively exer-
cise its commerce power45 by passing laws which expressly govern as-
the services provided must be closely scrutinized. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435
U.S. 444 (1978) (state airport flight fees); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (head tax on enplaning passengers); Clyde Mallory Lines v.
Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935) (state port vessel fees).
42. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 12-13; Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 35.
The argument that the City of Santa Monica's franchise fee is a lease for the land through
which the oil pipeline runs, meshes perfectly with the argument that the city's franchise fee
cannot be "fairly related" to the volume of oil flowing through the pipeline. See supra notes
38-40 and accompanying text. So long as the franchise fee is characterized as levied strictly for
use of land itself, the volume of oil pumped through the pipeline is irrelevant. In addition, if
the franchise fee is measured by the fair market value of the real estate through which the
pipeline runs, the city can more easily justify its new fee.
43. Shell, No. CV 82-2362, at 12-13.
44. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
45. Under the federal Constitution, only Congress has the affirmative commerce clause
power to make laws and compel private individuals to act. Consequently, courts seeking to
enforce the restrictions of the dormant aspect of the commerce clause must tread a fine line.
They can invalidate state actions which unduly interfere with interstate commerce, but they
cannot compel state action beyond this point. If a certain level of burden upon interstate
commerce were negative one (- 1), a court could push it back to zero (0), but never to positive
one (+ 1).
In its reply brief to the Ninth Circuit, Shell argued that the holdings in Haskell v.
Cowham, 187 F. 403, 407 (8th Cir. 1911) and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229,
260 (1911) stood for the proposition that the state must undertake affirmative action under the
commerce clause to grant franchises. Appellee's Reply Brief at 5, Shell Oil Co. v. City of
Santa Monica, No. 86-6103, No. 86-6206 (9th Cir. 1987). In Haskell and West the court did
force the state to grant franchises allowing pipelines to enter into interstate commerce, but
both cases are distinguishable from Shell. In the two older cases, the Oklahoma law acted to
prevent pipelines from crossing Oklahoma highways into neighboring states along the entirety
of each border. The facts of these two cases resemble those in Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.
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pects of interstate commerce.46 If a federal statute or a comprehensive
Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (4-4 decision), where the state
of California controlled virtually the entire California coastline. When a state has a monopoly
over all the routes a pipeline may travel to enter or leave the state's borders, a court will be
more likely to strike down the state law as burdensome to interstate commerce.
The rulings in Haskell and West can be viewed as a glass of water; being half-empty or
half-full is the same. Thus, what appears to be court compulsion of affirmative state action to
grant pipeline franchises, is merely the reverse side of invalidating a state law which overly
burdens interstate commerce. The courts never have the power to make affirmative law under
the commerce clause, they can only do what is necessary to enforce the dormant commerce
clause. In reality, though, the difference between what Congress and the courts can do under
the commerce clause is not always clear, especially in complex factual situations.
46. The power to regulate interstate commerce is one of the powers specifically granted to
Congress by the Constitution in article I, § 8. This commerce power is used in conjunction
with the necessary and proper clause of article I, § 8, clause 18, which "empowers Congress to
'make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' both the spe-
cific legislative powers granted to Congress by article I, § 8 itself, and 'all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.'" L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-3, at 227; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Chief Justice Marshall, in a preliminary discussion to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), "indicated that, in his view, congressional power to regulate 'commercial
intercourse' extended to all activity having any interstate impact-however indirect .... This
power would be plenary: absolute within its sphere, subject only to the Constitution's affirma-
tive prohibitions on the exercise of federal authority." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-4, at 232;
see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Later, however, the Court began to limit congressional power to regulate commerce by
substituting a more formal classification in place of Chief Justice Marshall's approach in Gib-
bons. This classification distinguished interstate commerce, which could be regulated by Con-
gress, from local activities, which could not be regulated by Congress. This was so, even if the
products of these local activities would later enter "interstate commerce." L. TRIBE, supra
note 17, § 5-4, at 234. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
The Court steered back towards Chief Justice Marshall's view of Congress' commerce
power as absolute when it rendered its decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones, the Court held that:
Congress could regulate labor relations at any manufacturing plant operated by an
integrated manufacturing and interstate sales concern because a work stoppage at
any such plant 'would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce.' Since
1937, in applying the factual test of Jones & Laughlin to hold a broad range of activi-
ties sufficiently related to interstate commerce to justify congressional action, the
Supreme Court has exercised little independent judgement, choosing instead to defer
to the expressed or implied findings of Congress to the effect that regulated activities
have the requisite 'substantial economic effect.' Such 'findings' have been upheld
whenever they could be said to rest upon some rational basis.
L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 235-36; see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
Presently, Congress can regulate not only acts which, taken alone, would have substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce, but also separate acts which, taken as an aggregate,
may reasonably be deemed to have a significant impact. Congress has relied upon this "cumu-
lative effect" theory as its justification for many types of legislation formerly considered be-
yond the scope of the commerce power. These include "civil rights legislation, certain
criminal statutes, regulatory measures affecting the sale of foods and additives, and a registra-
tion law for drug producers." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 5-5, at 236-37.
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scheme of federal regulation enacted under Congress' commerce power
directly conflicts with state regulation, the federal law governs.47
The second way in which the commerce clause restricts state power
is through judicial enforcement of the federal government's implied
power to regulate interstate commerce. When deciding a dormant com-
merce clause challenge to a state law, a court considers whether the state
law conflicts with the purposes behind the enactment of the commerce
clause. 48 In a typical dormant commerce clause situation, a state regula-
tion or tax is challenged as interfering with the free flow of interstate
commerce. Even though Congress may not have passed a law expressly
47. As long as Congress acts within an area specifically delegated to it by the Constitution,
here the power to regulate commerce granted to Congress by the commerce clause coupled
with the necessary and proper clause, the supremacy clause assures that any resulting federal
legislation will preempt state law which expressly conflicts with the federal legislation. Such
cases raise no controversial issues of federal versus state power. The source of federal power
becomes relevant, however, when state power is "ousted not because of specific conflict with
what Congress has done but because of negative implications thought to flow from what Con-
gress might have done." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-23, at 376. The dormant commerce
clause, which is an example of this implied federal power, serves as a breeding ground for
litigation since it is often unclear when a state law is in conflict with an implied federal power.
Falling between express congressional power and totally implied federal power is a:
hybrid category within which states are deemed powerless to act because of a vac-
uum deliberately, even if not expressly, created by federal legislation. In such, cases,
any state or local action, however consistent in detail with relevant federal statutes, is
held invalid-not because of a "dormant" federal power thought to be constitution-
ally exclusive but rather because the federal legislative scheme announces, or is best
understood as implying, a congressional purpose to "occupy the field."
L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-23, at 376-77; see generally Note, Preemption as a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
48. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-2, at 320-21. It should be noted that because the courts'
power to decide cases dealing with state interference with interstate commerce is an implied
rather than an express constitutional power, judgments in this area are always subject to con-
gressional revision. Id. at 321. See Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
Four conceptual justifications support a dormant aspect to the commerce clause:
(1) Diminution of power: The affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress
operates to diminish the reserved general regulatory and taxation powers of the state
where the regulation or tax affects interstate commerce; (2) Implied intention of Con-
gress: The failure of Congress to authorize specifically state regulation or taxation
affecting interstate commerce in certain circumstances indicates that Congress in-
tended that state regulation or taxation be precluded in those circumstances; (3) The
free trade principle: A major historical purpose for the grant of the commerce power
to Congress was to establish a national free trade area; state regulation or taxation
that unreasonably burdens interstate commerce or interferes with interstate trade or
movement is unconstitutional; (4) The nondiscrimination principle: A major histori-
cal purpose for the grant of the commerce power to Congress was to prevent eco-
nomic protectionism and discrimination against interstate commerce or out-of-state
interests in favor of local commerce or in-state interests; state regulation or taxation
that discriminates against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because of the
interstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests is
unconstitutional.
Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause As A Restriction On State Regulation And Taxation:
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dealing with the subject area of the state regulation or tax, the dormant
commerce clause may still preclude the state from enforcing a burden-
some regulation or tax. Thus, the negative aspect of the commerce
clause allows the federal government, through the courts, to control
more areas than it could if only Congress' affirmative actions
controlled.49
When a state regulation is challenged under the dormant commerce
clause, the court will normally perform a test that attempts to weigh the
competing state and federal interests. Traditionally, the Supreme Court
has used a balancing approach which focuses on the effect rather than the
form of a challenged state action."0 Under the Court's present test, a
"State regulation affecting interstate commerce will be upheld if (a) the
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state end, and (b) the regu-
latory burden imposed on interstate commerce, and any discrimination
against it, are outweighed by the state interest in enforcing the
regulation."'"
If the state's regulation does impede interstate commerce, the state
must show that it has a legitimate reason for doing so. Such a legitimate
reason may not, however, be used as a guise for impermissible state ac-
An Analysis In Terms Of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV., at 968-69 (footnotes
omitted) (1985).
Professor Sedler argues that the nondiscrimination principle is the only sound structural
basis for a dormant aspect to the commerce clause. Id. at 991-97.
49. Shell argued that the restrictions of the dormant commerce clause applied to the spe-
cific facts in Shell. In Haskell v. Cowham, 187 F. 403, 407 (8th Cir. 1911) and West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 260 (1911), the commerce clause "was used to strike down an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting pipeline companies from crossing beneath state highways if they
were transporting natural gas out of state and to compel the state to issue crossing rights."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 86-6103, No. 86-
6206 (9th Cir. 1987). The court in Gulf Interstate Gas Co. v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 115
F. Supp. 746 (W.D. La. 1953), ruled that a local ordinance which prevented pipelines from
passing through was invalid on commerce clause grounds. In Kassell v. Consolidated Freight
Ways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981), the commerce clause was used to strike down an Iowa statute
which forced certain types of trucks to bypass the state, and in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline
Corp. v. Milltown, 93 F. Supp. 287, 294-95 (D.N.J. 1950), "the court held that a city could not
enact zoning restrictions which would prohibit an interstate pipeline from passing through."
Appellant's Opening Brief, supra, at 8.
50. Note, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis-Protecting
Protectionism, 1985 DUKE L.J. 697, 700-01 (1985). The Court has developed two distinct lines
of cases in the commerce clause area-one for challenges to state taxes and one for challenges
to state regulations. The line of cases dealing with challenges to state taxes is discussed infra at
notes 168-233 and accompanying text.
51. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-5 (1978); see, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas
Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1950); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945).
Professor Christopher May, Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los
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tions.5 2 For example, state law cannot be justified as necessary to protect
public health when, in fact, the law is designed to protect economic inter-
ests within the state.
5 3
2. Market participant doctrine
a. United States Supreme Court cases
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has held that a state's actions are
exempt from dormant commerce clause scrutiny if the state is acting as a
market participant54 rather than as a market regulator.5  The market
participant doctrine stems from fundamental principles of state sover-
eignty. In the preeminent case in this area, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,5 6 the
Court stated that "state proprietary activities may be, and often are, bur-
dened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants.
Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should
similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the
inherent limits of the Commerce Clause."
'57
The doctrine was first used by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alex-
andria Scrap Corp. 8 Under Maryland law, scrap processors located
Angeles, has synthesized the various methods that the Court uses to evaluate state regulations
under the commerce clause into a workable outline:
Dormant Commnerce Clause Analysis
1. Is there a legitimate state purpose for the law?
2. Is there a rational relationship between the law and this state purpose?
3. Do the benefits to the state clearly outweigh the burdens upon interstate commerce?
3a. Has the state used the least burdensome alternative? (This prong of the analysis has
not been established to the same extent as the other parts of the test. Use of this requirement
makes it very difficult for state laws to pass judicial scrutiny under the commerce clause).
4. Has the state used the least discriminatory alternative to accomplish its goal? (The
state does not have to use the least discriminatory alternative if this alternative does not func-
tion as well as the present state regulation. Distinguish this from the more stringent prong 3a
where a less burdensome alternative may be required even if it is less efficient).
5. Is there an extraterritorial effect of the law? (A state law which unduly affects com-
merce outside of that state may be per se invalid). Derived from class lectures in Constitu-
tional Law given by Professor Christopher May, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles (Fall
Semester 1986). See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) for a summary of
the Court's approach in the dormant commerce clause area.
52. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (New York statute limiting
importation of out-of-state milk held unconstitutional as protectionist measure).
53. Id.
54. Market participant in this context refers to a situation where a state or a subdivision of
a state enters into the private marketplace as a seller or a buyer of goods or services.
55. Market regulator in this context refers to a situation where a state or a subdivision of a
state acting under its sovereign authority passes laws regulating the private market.
56. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
57. Id. at 439.
58. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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both within and outside Maryland received bounties from the state for
recycling old automobiles. 9 In 1974, the Maryland legislature changed
the law and required out-of-state processors to obtain a detailed docu-
mentation on an abandoned automobile before they could recycle it,
whereas in-state processors only had to obtain a simple indemnity
agreement.6 °
An out-of-state processor brought suit claiming that the 1974 law
unduly burdened interstate commerce.6' The district court agreed that
the state law imposed "substantial burdens upon the free flow of inter-
state commerce. ' 62 Under a commerce clause balancing test performed
by the district court, the decreased number of automobiles the out-of-
state processor was able to handle (federal interest in the free flow of
interstate commerce) outweighed legitimate state concern in reducing the
amount of state funds paid for processing cars abandoned out of the state
(state interest).63
In reversing the decision, the Supreme Court found that "Maryland
has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions
under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself
to bid up the price."'  Relying upon the principle of free enterprise be-
hind the enactment of the commerce clause,65 the Court held that
"[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause forbids a
State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.",
66
Another policy reason behind the Court's decision was the positive as-
pect of allowing individual states to create innovative programs to solve
local problems.67
The Alexandria Scrap decision has been criticized. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Brennan expressed concern that Maryland's law affected
too large an area of interstate commerce to allow Maryland to be exempt
as a market participant from commerce clause scrutiny. 68 Despite an
appearance of valid intent, the Maryland law would not have been al-
lowed under a traditional commerce clause analysis because " 'a state
59. Id. at 796-98.
60. Id. at 800-01.
61. Id. at 802.
62. Id. at 804.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 806.
65. See supra note 48 for an outline of the conceptual justifications supporting a dormant
aspect to the commerce clause.
66. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 817 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden the prosecution
of interstate business.' "69
Constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe also found fault with the
majority's opinion. According to Tribe, Alexandria Scrap cannot "be
satisfactorily explained by any notion that, when a state acts as buyer or
seller rather than regulator, its claim to autonomy as a state in the federal
system suddenly overrides ordinary commerce-clause considerations." 7
Instead, Tribe reasoned that the Court should have upheld Maryland's
selective bonus program because it "had not denied consumers in Mary-
land or elsewhere the opportunity to enjoy lower prices or higher quality
in the way that state interferences with out-of-state suppliers or servicers
ordinarily do; unlike most 'local grabs,' this one did not appear to injure
consumers or secondary purchasers."'71
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,72 the Court again addressed the issue of the
impact of the dormant commerce clause on state proprietary action. In
Reeves, the state of South Dakota operated a plant which for many years
supplied out-of-state buyers with cement.7 3 During a span of twenty
years, Reeves, Inc. (Reeves), a concrete distributor located in Wyoming,
purchased 95% of its cement from this state operated plant. When a
construction boom occurred which depleted the supply of cement, the
state decided to favor all South Dakota customers over out-of-state buy-
ers. The state informed Reeves that the state plant could no longer sup-
ply Reeves with cement.
Reeves then brought suit challenging the plant's preference for
South Dakota buyers. The district court permanently enjoined the prac-
tice, reasoning that "South Dakota's 'hoarding' was inimical to the na-
tional free market envisioned by the Commerce Clause."74 The Eighth
Circuit reversed and held that the practice was permissible under the
market participant doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed.76
In rebutting the argument that South Dakota had "exploited" the
interstate market, the Court found that "neighboring States long have
benefited from South Dakota's foresight and industry."' 77 The Court re-
69. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311
U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940)).
70. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-10, at 337.
71. Id.
72. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
73. Id. at 430-32.
74. Id. at 433.
75. Id.
76. id. at 447.
77. Id. at 440.
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fused to invalidate the state's practice because to do so "would interfere
significantly with a State's ability to structure relations exclusively with
its own citizens."78 Further, such a holding would inhibit local govern-
ments from trying new ways to solve local problems.79
The Court did not accept the assertion that South Dakota should
not be allowed to ban the export of cement since previous cases had held
that individual states could not hoard their commodities or resources.80
Cement was different from the natural resources at issue in the other
cases, the Court ruled, because cement is marketed in a manufactured
rather than natural state.81
In his dissent, Justice Powell argued that the South Dakota policy
represented the kind of economic protectionism that the Commerce
Clause was designed to prevent.82 Justice Powell asserted that a "[s]tate
enter[ing] the private market and operat[ing] a commercial enterprise for
the advantage of its private citizens,... may not evade the constitutional
policy against economic Balkanization.
' 83
One of the dangers of allowing a state to act free from the restraints
of the commerce clause via the market participant doctrine is that parties
removed from the initial transaction may be affected by the state's action.
For example, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employ-
ers, Inc.,84 the Court, in an opinion written by then Associate Justice
Rehnquist, upheld an order by the mayor of Boston requiring that all
construction projects funded by city funds be performed by a work force
consisting of at least one half bona fide city residents.
8 5
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented, arguing that
limitations should be placed upon the state's ability to shield its actions
78. Id. at 441.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 443; see, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana. 436 U.S.
371, 385-86 (1978) (right to hunt elk not "fundamental" right protected by privileges and
immunities clause). Cf Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (landfill sites); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923) (natural gas); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural gas); Note,
Solving New Jersey's Solid Waste Problem Constitutionally or Filling the Great Silences with
Garbage, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (1979).
81. 447 U.S. at 444.
82. Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissent in Reeves is particularly
interesting in light of the fact that he authored the majority opinion in Alexandria Scrap,
where the market participant doctrine was first used. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying
text.
83. 447 U.S. at 449-50 (Powell, J., dissenting).
84. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
85. Id. at 205-06.
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from commerce clause scrutiny under the market participant doctrine.86
Because the mayor's order directly restricted the ability of private em-
ployers to hire nonresidents, the order violated the premise of free trade
upon which the market participant doctrine was based.87 Justice Black-
mun contended that the market participant doctrine was never meant to
allow for regulation of third-party transactions under the guise of a right
of a state to operate in the private sector.88 Rather, he argued, a proper
test of the legitimacy of a claim to the market participant doctrine de-
pends upon "whether a particular state action more closely resembles an
attempt to impede trade among private parties, or an attempt, analogous
to the accustomed right of merchants in the private sector, to govern the
State's own economic conduct and to determine the parties with whom it
will deal."89
Following this line of reasoning, in South-Central Timber Develop-
ment, Inc. v. Wunnicke,9 ° the Court recognized that where a state at-
tempts to regulate parties beyond those with whom it had originally
contracted, the market participant doctrine will not apply.9' In South-
Central Timber Development, the Court struck down an Alaska law re-
quiring that timber buyers partially process logs before exporting them
outside of Alaska.92 Justice White wrote for the majority:
[t]he limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it
allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the mar-
ket in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further.
The State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regu-
lation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect
outside of that particular market.
93
Justice White added that an overly broad definition of the market partici-
pant doctrine had the potential to defeat the goal behind the commerce
86. Id. at 216-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 217-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 217-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court may have retreated from its holding
in White and moved closer to Justice Blackmun's dissent in that case when it decided United
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984). In Camden, a municipal
ordinance required that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors work-
ing on city construction projects be city residents. The effect of this ordinance was identical to
the statute in White. The Court, which had upheld the statute in White against commerce
clause attack, stated that it might be possible to strike down the ordinance in Camden on
privileges and immunities grounds.
90. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
91. Id. at 97-99.
92. Id. at 100.
93. Id. at 97.
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clause of eliminating obstructions to interstate commerce. 94
The facts of South-Central Timber Development fall in the gray area
between state regulations which affect the entire public and state self-
imposed rules which deal only with the state's conduct as a purchaser,
seller or employer in a particular market or industry. "In the former
case, the state's rule affects every decision to purchase, sell, or hire in the
relevant market; in the latter case, it affects only the transactions in
which the state itself is involved."95 The latter type of transaction argua-
bly has little impact upon "the natural functioning of the interstate
market." 96
In conclusion, by recognizing the "downstream effects" limitation
on the market participant exception, the Court acknowledged that state
governmental action can never be totally analogous to that of a private
trader. A private market participant's actions would never be suspect
merely because of the fact that they reach outside of that particular mar-
ket. Perhaps the Supreme Court refused to allow a state this same free-
dom due to the fact that a state's proprietary activities are at best only
one step removed from its sovereign capacity.
The market participant doctrine provides blanket immunity from
the restrictions of the dormant commerce clause with the consequent
failure to balance state and federal interests. State activities which would
be struck down under a balancing approach are permitted if the state is
acting as a participant in the market.9 7 Therefore, a state or a state sub-
division may be able to shield otherwise unconstitutional regulations or
taxes behind a guise of proprietary action.98
b. Western Oil & Gas Association v. Cory
Although the Supreme Court defined the market participant excep-
tion to judicial commerce clause analysis in only four cases, the doctrine
continues to be invoked in lower court hearings.99 In Western Oil & Gas
94. Id. at 97-98.
95. Wells & Hellerstein, The Governinental-Proprietary Distinction In Constitutional Law,
66 VA. L. Rev. 1073, 1127 (1980).
96. Id.
97. See Note, supra note 50, at 732-41 for an argument that the market participant doe-
trine should be more narrowly and objectively defined; see Comment, Commerce Clause fIn-
inunity for State Proprietary Activities: Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoI.'y 365,
378-79 (1981) for an argument that the doctrine is invalid when governments take protection-
ist measures that distort the free market.
98. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
99. See Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 613 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or.
1986) (dormant commerce clause did not apply to local ordinance governing use of landfill
because district was acting as market participant); Gary Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Riley, 285 S.C.
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Association v. Cory,"° the state of California claimed to be a market par-
ticipant in its dealings with several oil companies.10 The oil companies
involved in Cory operated offshore drilling rigs and transported crude oil
onshore by passing it over lands owned by the state of California. 2
Due to the location of the drilling rigs and the fact that the state
owned the tidal and submerged lands stretching for many miles in either
direction, it was impossible for the oil companies to transport the oil
without crossing state owned land."0 3 When California increased the
rental rates for use of this land, the oil companies filed a suit based on
violations of the federal commerce clause. " The state defended its
leasehold activities against the reach of the commerce clause on the
grounds that it was "merely one of many participants in the market com-
peting for leases."' 0 5
The Ninth Circuit held in Cory that because California had a com-
plete monopoly over coastal access, it could not invoke the market par-
ticipant doctrine." 6 In Cory, the state of California controlled the entire
coastline and no reasonable alternatives were available. 0 7 Judge Tang
wrote:
Although some of the lands are in the possession of local State
entities or private interests, this does not mean that California
becomes one of many competitors. The permanency of plain-
tiff's facilities does not permit them to "shop around." There is
no other competitor to which they can go for the rental of the
required strip of California coastline. The Commission has a
complete monopoly over the sites used by the oil companies.
The companies have no choice but to renew their leases despite
the volumetric rate, as the oil, gas and petroleum-derived prod-
ucts cannot be transported to plaintiff's facilities without trav-
498, 331 S.E.2d 335 (1985) (state statute giving preference to resident vendors held to be exer-
cise of market participant doctrine): Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, 576 F. Supp. 1290. 1296 n.7 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (market participant doctrine
did not shield state labor law from federal preemption).
100. 726 F.2d 1340.
101. Id. at 1342.
102. Id. at 1341.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1342.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1343. But see Brief of Amici Curiae for the Cities of Santa Monica, Culver City,
Torrance and Huntington Beach, at 9, Cory v. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n. No. 84-16 (U.S. Oct.
Term 1984).
107. 726 F.2d at 1343.
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ersing the state-owned lands.'0 8
In summary, a state possessing a monopoly cannot invoke the mar-
ket participant doctrine in the same way that a private corporation hold-
ing a monopoly is limited by antitrust law. In both cases, the presence of
a monopoly impedes the operation of a free market. Thus, if a state has a
monopoly over a particular market it simply cannot be one of many par-
ticipants in that market and will be subject to the restrictions of the com-
merce clause.
B. Analysis: Should the Market Participant Doctrine Allow Santa
Monica's Franchise Fee to Escape Commerce Clause
Scrutiny?
1. The parties' arguments
Judge Kelleher's decision to invoke the market participant doctrine
to exempt the City of Santa Monica's actions from all dormant com-
merce clause analysis depended a great deal on how the city's actions
were characterized. In support of its position that it was one of several
market participants, Santa Monica discussed the relevance of real prop-
erty and transportation, the significance of the alternatives available to
Shell and the difference between a franchise renewal versus an original
grant. ' 9 Shell's principal argument was that Santa Monica's possession
of a monopoly precluded its use of the market participant doctrine t 10
Santa Monica urged that the fact that real property was involved in
the case did not call for any different analytical treatment concerning the
application of the market participant doctrine. " ' I Further, Santa Monica
argued that the fact that Shell's activity was transportation, a field which
sometimes receives great protection under the commerce clause, rather
than another field such as manufacturing, was irrelevant. 1 2 According
to Santa Monica, the only element of importance was "whether a partic-
108. Id.
109. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 15-26.
110. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 49, at 16-17.
111. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 15. See Shayne Bros. v. District of Co-
lumbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984) (market participant doctrine applied to city owned
landfill); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984) (county owned dump
sites exempt from commerce clause); Marine Park Boats, Inc. v. Halberg, 58 Misc. 2d 938, 297
N.Y.S.2d 236, 240, aff'd, 33 App. Div. 2d 32, 306 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1969) (rejected commerce
clause challenge to rental increase for city-owned wharves).
112. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 15. See Salem Transp. Co. v. Port
Auth., 611 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (permit charge based on percentage of gross trans-
portation receipts not subject to commerce clause scrutiny); Transportation Limousine of
Long Island, Inc. v. Port Auth., 571 F. Supp. 576, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Port Authority com-
pared to private participant in market for ground transport services).
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ular state action more closely resemble[d] an attempt to impede trade
among private parties, or an attempt, analogous to the accustomed right
of merchants in the private sector, to govern the State's own economic
conduct and to determine the parties with whom it will deal.""' 3
Santa Monica readily admitted that surface use of streets and high-
ways was protected by the commerce clause but argued that "the perma-
nent and exclusive use of subsurface property falls into a different
category altogether.""' 4 Santa Monica maintained that three reasons jus-
tified this distinction. First, while occasional surface use of streets in-
volved a quintessential governmental activity, the street's underground
use did not.115 Second, the granting of easements should be treated as
proprietary because of their exclusive and permanent nature. 1 6 The
city's position was that "it is irrelevant whether the grantee obtains sur-
face or subsurface rights. The transfer of property rights to franchisees,
even in city streets, is a proprietary function of local government.""' 7
Third, the City of Santa Monica had an obligation to obtain proper com-
pensation for land, here land beneath city streets, held in public trust." 8
Santa Monica also countered Shell's argument that the city's posses-
sion of a monopoly precluded its use of the market participant doctrine
113. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 16 (quoting White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 218 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part)).
114. Id. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (protec-
tionist highway regulation burdens interstate commerce).
115. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 16. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1959) (Illinois statute requiring trucks to use special mudguards held to
unduly burden interstate commerce). Santa Monica added that "[s]treets are unique and indis-
pensable when it comes to surface transportation. They are not, however, when it comes to a
subsurface pipeline. The subsurface is no different wherever a pipeline is laid, whether it be
under a street, other city property, or under private property." Appellee's Answering Brief,
supra note 11, at 16-17.
116. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 17.
117. Id. See City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Corp., 42 Cal. 2d 110, 266 P.2d 14
(1954); Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 118 P. 796 (1911); see also St. Louis
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98-105 (1892).
118. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 17-18; see Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.
California State Lands Comm'n, 105 Cal. App. 3d 554, 164 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1980); see also Los
Angeles Athletic Club v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 130 Cal. App. 376, 386, 20 P.2d 130, 134
(1933) (lease to private parties not governmental function); Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pasadena,
161 Cal. 265, 271, 118 P. 796, 798 (1911) (no right to occupy portions of public highways in
absence of permission); Gurnsey v. Northern Cal. Power Co., 160 Cal. 699, 705, 117 P. 906,
908 (1911) (municipality may not give permission to enter highway if inconsistent with public
easement); San Francisco St. Artists Guild v. Scott, 37 Cal. App. 3d 667, 670. 112 Cal. Rptr.
502, 504 (1974) (no right to conduct private business in public streets); Slemons v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 252 Cal. App. 2d 1022, 1026, 60 Cal. Rptr. 785, 787 (1967) (private use must
confer sufficient public benefit to be consistent with city's public use easement in streets).
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by stating that "unlike the oil companies in [Western Oil & Gas Associa-
tion v.] Cory, Shell has many viable alternatives from which to
choose.""' 9 Santa Monica stressed that the importance of these alterna-
tives to the market participant doctrine lay in the fact that "for Santa
Monica to entice Shell to renew the franchise, the city cannot set its
franchise fee so high that it would be more economical for Shell to go
elsewhere."' 0 Santa Monica pointed out that "even if Santa Monica
possessed bargaining leverage," the city did not necessarily enjoy a mo-
nopoly. 12 1 Santa Monica conceded that it had a monopoly to the specific
land through which the oil pipeline ran, 12 2 but warned that if such pos-
session were legally held to be a monopoly, then all ownership of land
could be construed to be a monopoly.1
2 3
Finally, Santa Monica disputed Shell's claim that the franchise re-
newal differed, for purposes of the market participant doctrine, from an
initial grant. 24 Relying upon past cases dealing with the market partici-
pant doctrine, the city stated that it did not have the obligation to con-
tinue its present market activities simply because Shell had relied upon
their existence.' 25 To rule otherwise would force Santa Monica to renew
the franchise ad infinitum.
126
Shell, on the other hand, argued that the district court erroneously
held that the market participant doctrine applied to this case.' 27 Shell's
primary contention was that the Cory monopoly exception to the market
participant doctrine should be extended to the facts in Shell Oil Co. v.
City of Santa Monica."28 In Cory, the State of California controlled vir-
tually all of the California coastline.' 29 The Cory court held that because
no viable transport alternatives available to the oil companies existed,
119. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 22. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.
Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (4-4 decision); South Central
Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984); Shayne Bros. v. Prince George's County, 556 F.
Supp. 182 (D.C. Md. 1983); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958); see also
County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
120. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 23.
121. Id. at 24.
122. Id. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958); Shayne Bros. v.
Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D.C. Md. 1983); see also County Comm'rs v.
Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
123. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 24.
124. Id. at 25.
125. Id. at 25-26. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440; Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 809; Arrow
Air, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York, 602 F. Supp. 314, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
126. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 25-26.
127. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 49, at 13-19.
128. No. CV 82-2362 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986).
129. 726 F.2d at 1341, 1343; see supra note 25.
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California possessed a "complete monopoly" and, therefore, could not
invoke the market participant doctrine. 3 °
Even if the possession of a complete monopoly by the defendant
forecloses the application of the market participant doctrine, the problem
of what constitutes a "complete monopoly" remains. Shell argued that
"[t]he question of whether or not there is a monopoly is not a theoretical
question, it is a practical question."'' Shell analogized the City of Santa
Monica's control of the pipeline located beneath city streets to the city's
control over the surface of the streets for use by automobiles and pedest-
rians. 132 Just as the city could not "deny the reasonable use of the sur-
face of those streets for vehicular and pedestrian traffic on the grounds
that the traffic could always travel on private property or go through
neighboring cities," it could not deny a similar right of way to under-
ground pipelines. 133 In addition, Shell argued that the expense of relo-
cating the existing refineries and pipeline "as a practical matter rule[d]
out 'competing' means of transportation or alternate pipeline routes."
' 1 34
Thus, Shell contended, the City of Santa Monica enjoyed a complete mo-
nopoly over the corridor of land available for this particular pipeline and
should be enjoined from invoking the market participant doctrine.
35
Shell also urged that the conditions imposed on the franchise agree-
ment by the City of Santa Monica did not further a major theory sup-
porting the market participant exception: that competition is increased
when the city or state is allowed to join the marketplace. 136 Shell argued
that the advantages enjoyed by the city did not increase competition in a
way that benefited anyone but the city itself.'37 From Shell's viewpoint,
130. Id. Arguably, this same rationale applies on a smaller scale to the present case-the
facts in Shell differ from those in Cory only in degree, not in kind.
131. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities Apr. 7, 1986 at 18, Shell Oil Co. v.
City of Santa Monica, No. CV 82-2362 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986) [hereinafter Memorandum].
132. Appellant's Reply Brief at 11-15, Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 86-6103,
No. 86-6206 (9th Cir. 1987).
133. Memorandum, supra note 131, at 18.
134. Id. at 18-19; see note 27 for an interesting twist to this complaint.
135. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 132, at 15-18.
136. Memorandum, supra note 131, at 11; see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
137. Memorandum, supra note 131, at 11; see Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 95, at 1073
(1980). Michael Wells and Walter Hellerstein, law professors at the University of Georgia,
wrote:
[I]f economic Balkanization is the evil that the commerce clause was designed to
prevent, what difference does it make whether the evil is brought about by states
acting in their governmental or proprietary capacities? ... To allow the state to
Balkanize the national economy through its proprietary activities would be a tri-
umph of form over substance-it would permit the states to do indirectly what they
could not do directly and would fly in the face of the Court's express admonition.
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the city was "attempting to benefit its citizens by charging an extraordi-
narily high and outlandish fee which Shell [would] then have to either
absorb or pass on to consumers in general."' 38 Shell asserted that "the
City [was] attempting to hoard money, thereby benefiting its citizens at
the expense of citizens elsewhere."1 39 Because the city's rent increase did
not benefit either commerce or consumers, the purpose behind the mar-
ket participant doctrine was defeated. 140
2. Failure of the sovereign/proprietary distinction
By deciding that the city, acting in its proprietary capacity, could
raise its franchise fees, the Shell court was following Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's position that " 'the role of government as sovereign is subject to
more stringent limitations than is its role of government as employer,
property owner or educator.' "41 Under this view "only sovereign inter-
Id. at 1125.
138. Memorandum, supra note 131, at 11; see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429 (1980).
139. Memorandum, supra note 131, at 11.
140. However, it is worth noting "that the economically inefficient character of [a] state's
action [does not] give rise to a commerce clause objection; economic efficiency, however desira-
ble, is not a criterion of constitutionality under the commerce clause." Wells & Hellerstein,
supra note 95, at 1126 (footnotes omitted).
141. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1316 (1984) (quoting Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 908-10
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Chief Justice Rehnquist has been the foremost modern
proponent of the sovereign/proprietary distinction, See Rehnquist, The First Amendment:
Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1976) (suggesting separate
categories for government as employer and as property owner); see also United States Postal
Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo.
424 U.S. 1, 290-91 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussion of
sovereign/proprietary distinction); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
571 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (lowered scrutiny of refusal to show the play "Hair"
taken by city in its proprietary capacity); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
283 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (refusal of medical care to indigent immigrants allowed);
see, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-48 (1983) (taxing power
subject to lesser constitutional restriction than criminal statutes).
Recently retired Justice Powell also endorsed the validity of the distinction. See. etg..
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (public defender's malpractice not attributa-
ble to any state action); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 n.13 (1980) (government acting as
employer held to lower standard in free speech area); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828. 836 (1976)
(state acting as private property owner has power to preserve property for its intended use); cf
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.13 (1980) (CIA may protect substantial govern-
ment interests even by infringing some first amendment rights).
Many contemporary scholars, however, reject the distinction. See Linde, Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. RE.V.
10 (1965); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction, 81 HARv. L. Rrv. 1439.
1458-64 (1968); see also Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 16
UCLA L. REV. 751, 754 n.14 (1969): see, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (condi-
tions on interstate travel); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (conditions on use of state
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ference is forbidden interference"' 42 and market participation by states
performing proprietary functions is encouraged.
Several problems remain with the practical application of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's theory. First, the actions of states taken in their proprie-
tary capacities may infringe constitutional rights to the same extent as
the actions of states made in their sovereign capacities.' 43 For example,
if the government, acting in a proprietary capacity, chose to revoke ac-
cess to the United States mails by a dissident news magazine, first amend-
ment rights would be harmed to a greater extent than if either a fine or a
prison sentence had been imposed on the editor.1" In addition, it is
often easier for the government to deny allocation of a benefit rather than
have to find and prosecute violators of a criminal statute."' Further-
more, a denial of benefits does not have to be drawn with the specificity
or applied with the due process protections required in criminal
prosecutions. 1
46
A second problem with the Chief Justice's theory is that a govern-
ment funded enterprise, even when it operates in a "free market," can
university); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S 507 (1980) (conditions on government employment);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (conditions on public office); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973) (conditions on government contracts); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966)
(conditions on admission to legislature).
142. Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1316 (footnote omitted).
143. For example,
[t]he Court has long recognized that fines may deter no less thoroughly than the
threat of prison and taxes no less effectively than fines. From this recognition, it is
only a short step to acknowledging that the deprivation of a monetary benefit by the
government acting in its proprietary capacity may be an equally effective deterrent.
Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1318. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (threat of burdensome and selective tax may effectively
censor press); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-48 (1936) (holding newspa-
per revenue tax invalid and recounting historical instances of censorship through taxation of
press); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (tax on sale of liquor found to be penalty
to enforce prohibition); Baily v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922) (tax on inter-
state trade in products of child labor found to be penalty for employment of children).
144. Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1318-19. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Demo-
cratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 434-35 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (revo-
cation of second class mail privilege is "in effect a very heavy fine"); cf Hannegan v. Esquire,
Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946) (denial of second class mail rate implicates constitutional
rights).
145. Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1319. A denial of benefits is easy to implement. The
government already knows who the people lining up to receive the benefit are-all the govern-
ment must do is simply stop giving the aid. If the beneficiaries wish to continue receiving aid
they may have to forego some rights. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (condi-
tioning welfare payments on consent to home inspections). Cf Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 387 & n. 12 (1978) (parents of children from prior marriage must obtain court order certi-
fying their ability to support those children not in their custody before remarrying).
146. Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1319.
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never "claim the same genealogy as a private enterprise. Somewhere
along the line it rests on the sovereign taxing power, and it cannot plausi-
bly claim to be the unsullied product of freely adopted private
choices."' 47 Behind the so-called proprietary action of a public univer-
sity or a state tax collector stands the armed might of the government.
Neither "proprietor" would be able to assert its will so effectively if it did
not have, the sovereign and its monopoly on coercive violence supporting
it. 48 Following this line of reasoning, state proprietary actions should be
treated more nearly the same as state sovereign actions for purposes of
determining their constitutionality.'49
An opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrates the failure of
the sovereign/proprietary distinction. 50 In United States Postal Service
v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,' a federal statute made
placing unstamped material in individual mailboxes in a government post
office a crime. 52 The statute was challenged as an infringement of first
amendment freedom of speech by a community organization that wanted
to leave its newsletter in the mailboxes of its members.1
5 3
The Chief Justice upheld the statute by relying on the premise that
the government as a private owner of property could preserve the prop-
erty for its intended use.'" 4  However, what Chief Justice Rehnquist
viewed as a wholly proprietary action by the government was actually
147. Id. at 1320. However, Professor Kreimer also asserted that:
In an ideal free market economy, more resources should accrue to those who
more efficiently produce desirable goods and services. There is, therefore, a widely
discussed efficiency justification for the ordering of economic power that results from
private action. No such claim can be made for aggregations of capital formed
through government's power to tax and appropriate funds.
Moreover, the efficiency argument merely justifies the existence of some prop-
erty rights, not of a particular distribution scheme that vests particular rights in the
government. It provides more plausible support for the sovereign/proprietary dis-
tinction that has recently gained currency in commerce clause litigation.
Id. at n.84.
148. Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1320.
149. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia. the
Court held that because distinguishing easily between "traditional" and "nontraditional" gov-
ernmental functions was impossible, the rule in National League of Cities v. Usery. 426 U.S.
833 (1976), should be overturned. The Court in National League of Cities held that Congress,
acting under its commerce power, could not pass legislation enforceable against the states "in
areas of traditional governmental functions." 426 U.S. at 852. Because the Court ruled inl
Garcia that state sovereign and proprietary actions could not be distinguished for purposes of
10th amendment immunity, perhaps the sovereign/proprietary distinction upon which the
market participant doctrine is based is no longer valid.
150. Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1321.
151. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
152. Id. at 116.
153. Ld. at 116-17.
154. Id. at 129-30.
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sovereign. The government had not purchased the right to control access
to the mailboxes, thereby taking the position of proprietor of those mail-
boxes. Instead, the government in its sovereign capacity, had made de-
positing unstamped material in the mailboxes a crime. Even if a state as
a private property owner should be held to a lower standard of constitu-
tional review than a state acting in its sovereign capacity, how will a
court make a principled determination of this difference? Just as the
Court has found identification of a private party's activities as state ac-
tion increasingly difficult,' 55 ascertaining when government is acting as a
proprietor appears equally uncertain.
Extended to the facts in Shell, the court's inability to distinguish
between sovereign and proprietary functions of government 156 leads to
the conclusion that the market participant doctrine should not exist.
1 57
The question of whether the market participant doctrine exempted the
activities of Santa Monica from the constraints of the commerce clause
was overly dependent upon the characterization of these activities by the
court. Because proprietary activities of government arguably should not
receive even a lowered standard of constitutional review,' 58 a strong ar-
gument can be made that total immunity for proprietary action js unwar-
ranted. The claim by the city that it is only a market participant will
always be tainted by the realization that the city's role as private prop-
erty owner cannot be divorced from its role as tax assessor.
5 9
155. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (14th amendment held to bar state from
enforcing restrictive racial covenant in private contract because of presence of state action
denying petitioner's constitutional rights); see also Pennsylvania v. Board of City Trusts, 353
U.S. 230 (1957) (board of private college held to be agent of state and, therefore, subject to
14th amendment).
156. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946) (Court unanimously con-
cluded that governmental/proprietary distinction was unworkable and must be abandoned);
see also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 457 & n.14 (1978) (federal registration
tax held not to violate implied immunity of state government from federal taxation); Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946) (Congressional Enabling Act held to govern state land sales
designed to raise money for public schools).
157. This argument goes beyond those that Shell made. Shell conceded that the sovereign/
proprietary distinction was possible when it stated that the market participant doctrine did not
apply because "'the City was acting in its governmental capacity, not in any proprietary capac-
ity." Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 49, at 15. See Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App.
2d 558, 561-62, I1 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (1961) ("Public highways belong to all the people of the
state. Every citizen has the right to use them subject to legislative regulation.") Specifically,
when the city decides who is to make what use of the public streets (to which the city only
owns an easement) it is exercising a governmental power. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra
note 49, at 15-16.
158. Kreimer, supra note 141, at 1322.
159. The argument can be made, however, that of all the subdivisions of the state, munici-
palities most deserve the protection afforded by the market participant doctrine. In recent
years the courts have tended to treat local government units as
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Further, the right to occupy streets for secondary purposes, such as
pipes, poles and wires is frequently called a franchise. 6 ' A franchise is
defined as a special privilege a city grants in its governmental capacity as
opposed to a license which is a right or privilege a city bestows in a
proprietary capacity. 161 Consequently, a municipality probably grants a
privilege to lay an oil pipeline in its sovereign capacity. Therefore, a mu-
nicipality's argument that it can escape the restraints of the dormant
commerce clause by claiming that its action is proprietary is precluded.
This game of semantics is not one that a court should be forced to
play. The ownership of the surface of streets has historically been held to
be a sovereign activity, 6 2 although in some cases a private road system
could conceivably serve as an alternative. Why, then, should the owner-
ship of an easement to the subsurface of city streets be held not to consti-
tute sovereign activity? A policy favoring access to a public road over
access to subterranean land for an oil pipeline must rest on articulable
grounds of decision. Granting that such a distinction may not exist, the
denial of use of subsurface land for an oil pipeline should at least be
subject to constitutional review.' 63 The decision to exempt a municipal-
distinct from the sovereign state and the state's agents. For example, municipalities
have not enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity; they are not exempt from enforce-
ment of federal antitrust laws to the same extent as are the states themselves; and the
Court has at least entertained the possibility that municipalities may have First
Amendment rights.
L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 7 (Supp. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
Thus, because municipalities are increasingly considered to be unlike the rest of the state
and, presumably, closer to a private entity, perhaps they are also entitled to the benefits of the
market participant doctrine. A market participant doctrine limited to cities and towns would
still be a troublesome concept in light of the courts' difficulty with the sovereign/proprietary
distinction, but at least this doctrine would be consistent with the courts' treatment of local
government in other areas of constitutional adjudication.
160. 34 CAL. JUR. 3D Franchises From Governmental Bodies § 3, at 479 (1978); Stockton
Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Joaquin County, 148 Cal. 313, 83 P. 54 (1905); Suisun City v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 35 Cal. App. 380, 170 P. 1078 (1917).
161. 134 CAL. JUR. 3D Franchises From Governmental Bodies § 2, at 477 (1978); Copt-Air,
Inc. v. San Diego, 15 Cal. App. 3d 984, 93 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
162. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (Iowa law banning
trucks over fifty-five feet long struck down as unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Illinois statute requiring
contoured mudguards violated dormant commerce clause because most other states permitted
straight mudguards); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S, 177
(1938) (use of state highways "peculiarly of local concern").
163. However, the market participant doctrine arguably should apply to the facts in Shell
because enough of the burden of Santa Monica's action falls upon in-state residents (e.g.,
higher oil prices). This being the case, "the political process within the state should serve as an
inner political check on the state's decisions to participate in the marketplace." J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.9, at 284 (1986). See infra notes 231-33
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ity's actions from commerce clause scrutiny must never rest on words
alone.
IV. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES
TO STATE TAXATION
A. Background
Presuming that the market participant doctrine does not apply to
the City of Santa Monica's actions, Santa Monica's franchise fee will be
subject to judicial scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause. In Shell
Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica,"6 Judge Kelleher may have defined the
franchise fee as a form of local tax.'65 To help explain Judge Kelleher's
analysis of the city's franchise fee, this section presents a background on
the dormant commerce clause tax cases. The first part of this back-
ground section discusses the line of cases leading to the development of
the Supreme Court's present test of the validity of state taxes under the
dormant commerce clause. In the second part of this section, the
Supreme Court's present test as formulated in Complete Auto Transit
Inc. v. Brady 66 is outlined. Finally, the third part discusses the United
States Supreme Court's application of the Complete Auto Transit test to
the facts in a case involving a state severance tax on coal: Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Montana.67
1. Shift in approaches prior to Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady
Although in evaluating state taxation cases the Supreme Court
could apply the interest-balancing approach used in evaluating state reg-
ulations under the dormant aspect of the commerce clause, it has not
done So.168 Two primary reasons explain the Court's reluctance: (1) the
and accompanying text for a discussion of deference to the political process in the context of
challenges to state taxation under the dormant commerce clause.
164. No. CV 82-2362 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986).
165. Id. at 8-13. The reader is cautioned that Santa Monica's franchise fee can be viewed as
either a local tax or as a user fee. For a definition of the term user fee, see supra note 31. This
Note takes the position that because the connection between the oil pipeline franchise fee and
the value of the use of the city's easement beneath city streets is difficult to ascertain, the
franchise fee is conceptually closer to a tax and a dormant commerce clause tax analysis
should apply. However, if a measurable relationship between the franchise fee and the use of
city-controlled property exists, a user fee situation would be present and a tax analysis would
not apply. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
166. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
167. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
168. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 344; see also id. at 345 n.3. State taxes may infringe as
much upon business conducting interstate commerce as do state regulations. "The power to
tax is a dominant power over commerce." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
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state's ultimate interest remains the same in all tax cases-raising reve-
nue;1 6 9 and (2) an overlap exists between the tests used to determine the
significance of the state's link with the taxpayer and those employed to
measure the extent to which the state burdens interstate commerce.1
7 0
Thus, state decisions concerning the validity of state taxes in relation to
the demands of the commerce clause focus almost exclusively upon the
taxes' adverse effect upon interstate commerce.
171
From the time the Supreme Court handed down its first case invali-
dating a state tax as a violation of the dormant commerce clause, 172 it has
vacillated in its approach to decision-making in this area. In the early
cases, the constitutionality of a state tax depended upon whether it could
be classified as a direct or indirect burden on interstate commerce. 73 A
state tax on interstate commerce itself was a "direct burden" and beyond
the reserved power of the state.174 However, if a state tax affected a local
Although the Court has developed two distinct lines of commerce clause challenges, one for
state regulations and one for state taxes, there has been overlap. For regulation cases that rely
on tax cases: Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc.
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333 (1977); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). For tax cases that rely on regulation cases: Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707 (1972); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963); Nippert v. Rich-
mond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). Note, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation of Energy
Resources: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 425, 431 n.25 (1982).
169. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-14, at 344.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); see generally Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851). Cooley divided the possible subjects of regulation into two classes: (a) those national
in character requiring exclusive control by Congress, and (b) those local in character allowing
the states to have concurrent control along with Congress. This doctrine was first applied to
the taxation area in Case of the State Freight Tax. For a general reference in this area, see P.
HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953).
173. This approach to state taxation cases under the dormant commerce clause lasted
roughly from the end of the Civil War to the eve of World War II. The artificial insulation
from state taxation given to business under this approach was tolerated because of the high
priority Americans gave to business growth and industrial expansion.
174. Under this direct/indirect approach, business which was exclusively interstate com-
merce could not be subjected to a franchise tax even if the tax was apportioned to activities
within the taxing state. See Simet & Lynn, Interstate Commerce Must Pay Its Way: The
Demise of Spector, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 53, 55 (1978). During this period the Court upheld taxes
on the property of interstate businesses, including railroads, telegraph and telephone compa-
nies, that used their property exclusively in interstate transactions, on the premise that such
taxes were only "indirect taxes" which did not impose an "undue burden" on commerce.
Hellerstein, State Taxation under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND.
L. Rnv. 335, 336 (1976).
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activity,' 75 placing only an "indirect burden" upon interstate commerce,
the tax did not violate the tenets of the dormant commerce clause and,
thus, was permissible.176 Under this approach, a state could tax what
was deemed a strictly local activity in order to avoid the restrictions of
the commerce clause. This was true even if the state tax was measured
by gross receipts or net income generated by interstate sales.' 7 7
On the other hand, state taxes levied solely on the privilege of doing
business were struck down because they were classified as unconnected
with local activity.178 However, the Court's approach in this area was
flawed by vagueness. The Court used the local versus non-local test to
determine if a state tax was invoked for the privilege of doing business. 1
79
This test, which favored form over substance, proved unworkable since
the Court encountered difficulty distinguishing local from non-local
activity. 180
In the late 1930's, the Court abolished the traditional notion that,
under the dormant commerce clause, interstate commerce may not be
taxed at all.' Prevailing economic theory at that time imposed a just
share of state tax burdens upon interstate commerce. 8 2 What came to
be known as the Multiple Burdens or Taxation Doctrine interpreted the
commerce clause as forbidding discrimination against, or multiple taxa-
tion of, interstate commerce. 183 Generally, under this doctrine, a state
tax imposed upon a business conducting interstate commerce had to be
175. State taxes on manufacturing, producing, mining and other businesses conducted
within state borders were regarded as being imposed on activities taking place before the com-
merce began, i.e., "local" activities. Hellerstein, supra note 174, at 336.
176. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Cleveland, Cincinnati,
Chicago and St. Louis Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894).
177. See Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); Joseph v. Carter &
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947), overruled, Department of Rev. v. Association of
Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); J.D. Adams Mfg. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
307 (1938); Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936).
178. See Note, Judicial Review Under Complete Auto Transit: When is a State Tax on
Energy-Producing Resources "Fairly Related"?, 1982 DUKE L.J. 682, 685 (1982); see, e.g.,
Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Spector Motor Serv. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203
(1925).
179. See Note, supra note 178, at 685.
180. Postal Telephone-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919); see Lockhart, A
Revolution in State Taxation of Commerce?, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1981).
181. See generally Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873) (state
freight tax imposed on interstate carrier held unconstitutional).
182. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (Supreme Court up-
held unapportioned gross receipts tax on privilege of selling advertising from magazine circu-
lated interstate). See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
183. Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254-56.
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carefully tailored to the amount of taxable activity occurring within the
state. States which did not strictly apportion their taxes in this manner
overtaxed. If several states enacted similar, excessive taxes, interstate
businesses were taxed more than once for a single transaction leading to a
cumulative burden upon interstate commerce not borne by local
commerce. 1
84
Such multiple taxation was not per se unconstitutional. A state
could impose a tax upon a company conducting a strictly interstate busi-
ness if that tax was properly apportioned and did not duplicate a tax
already levied by another state. 185 However, apportionment was neces-
sary only to avoid over- or undertaxation of an interstate transaction
which could not be separated into a sufficiently local activity. If an inter-
state transaction could be related to a sufficiently local activity, it would,
by that very fact, be "uniquely defined, and thus not capable of multiple
application."' 86 Additionally, a showing that such cumulative taxation
was theoretically possible was insufficient; the challenger of the tax also
had to convince the court that the '!particular interstate transactions
taxed [were] actually cumulatively burdened by multiple taxation
"187
The Court's inconsistent approach to state taxation cases became
apparent when the Court abruptly rejected the Multiple Burdens Doc-
trine in Freeman v. Hewit.'88 In Freeman, the state had imposed an
unapportioned tax on the gross receipts of securities sold in New York by
an Indiana trustee on behalf of an Indiana estate.189 Justice Frankfurter,
in striking down the state tax, argued that the commerce clause pre-
184. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 6-17, at 360.
185. Under this view, a state was not barred by the commerce clause from levying n fairly
apportioned net income tax on a foreign corporation that conducted exclusively interstate busi-
ness in the state. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959).
Also, a state could require out-of-state vendors, operating in the state only through in-
dependent contractors or brokers, to collect use taxes on shipments of goods to local custom-
ers. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
186. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-18. at 362. See Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 260;
Carter & Weekes, 330 U.S. at 429.
187. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-17, at 360. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington.
377 U.S. 436 (1964); Central R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962).
188. 329 U.S. 249 (1946). The Freeman Court refused to follow its prior ruling in Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). In Adams, concerning roughly the same set of faclts
as Freeman, the Court held that an Indiana tax was invalid "when applied, without apportion-
ment, to gross receipts derived from interstate sales of goods made by Indiana manufacturers
who sold and shipped them to purchasers in other states." Freeman, 329 U.S. at 259 (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
189. 329 U.S. at 250-51.
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cluded the states from impeding the free flow of trade between the states
and that a direct tax on interstate commerce constituted such an imper-
missible burden.' 90 He added that courts were not capable of properly
weighing the various factors involved in determining the nonduplication
of direct taxes.191 Rather, it was the courts' task merely to draw lines:
one example, the direct/indirect test.192
The weakness in the Court's approach of merely labeling what was
an unconstitutional levy by a state was demonstrated by two cases de-
cided after Freeman. In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia (Rail-
way I),193 a state tax was declared invalid because it was called a
privilege tax.'94 In a second case involving the same parties, Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia (Railway II),195 the Court allowed the
tax to stand after the Virginia legislature redrafted the statute to omit the
word "privilege." '96 Thus, even though the effect of the tax remained the
same, the use of another name made the tax valid under the ruling in
Freeman. 
97
The resurrection in Freeman of the direct/indirect test was ex-
panded upon in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor.98 In Spector,
Connecticut had levied a tax on the privilege of doing business which was
measured by net income allocated to the state.' 99 The taxpayer, an out-
of-state corporation, operated an interstate trucking business with stops
in Connecticut. 00 The Court invalidated the state tax, determining that
the states could not levy even a fairly apportioned net income tax on the
190. Id. at 256-57. However, in an earlier part of the opinion, Justice Frankfurter did not
shield all commercial activity from state taxation. He resurrected the "direct burden/indirect
burden" distinction of the early cases by stating: "when accommodation must be made be-
tween state and national interests, manufacture within a State, though destined for shipment
outside, is not a seamless web so as to prevent a State from giving the manufacturing part
detached relevance for purposes of local taxation." Id. at 255.
191. Id. at 256.
192. Id. at 253-54; see also 44 P. KURLAND & G. CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU-
MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 437-684
(1975) (reprint of briefs and other court documents from Freeman).
193. 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
194. Id. at 369.
195. 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
196. Id. at 436.
197. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975) (artificial distinction between
"privilege of carrying on or doing business" and "qualification to carry on or do business");
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (distinction
drawn between invalid tax on privilege of engaging in interstate commerce and valid tax on net
income derived from interstate commerce).
198. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
199. Id. at 603.
200. Id. at 606-07.
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privilege of doing an exclusively interstate business. 20 '
In summary, during the Freeman/Spector era, a state could not tax
business for the privilege of conducting interstate commerce within the
state's borders. However, the weakness of this approach was its reliance
on the label, rather than an inquiry into the actual effects of the tax.
Consequently, a state could avoid the restrictions of the Freeman/Spector
rule by simply calling its tax something other than a privilege tax.
2. The Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Br 202 test
To avoid the problems associated with the "magic label" approach
of the Freeman/Spector line of cases, the Court expressly reversed
Spector in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.0 3 In Complete Auto
Transit, the plaintiff was a Michigan-based motor carrier that trans-
ported automobiles manufactured outside of Mississippi to Mississippi
dealers. 2 4 The vehicles were first shipped by rail to Jackson, Mississippi,
where, within forty-eight hours, they were loaded onto trucks destined
for individual dealers. 20 5 A tax equal to five percent of the gross income
of the plaintiff's business conducted within the state was levied pursuant
to two Mississippi statutes. 2 6 The Mississippi Supreme Court, ruling
that the state tax was constitutional, concluded:
It will be noted that Taxpayer has a large operation in this
State. It is dependent upon the State for police protection and
other State services the same as other citizens. It should pay its
fair share of taxes so long, but only so long, as the tax does not
201. Id. at 608-10.
202. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
203. Id. at 288-89.
204. Id. at 276.
205. Id.
206. The Mississippi statutes authorizing this tax stated:
There is hereby levied and assessed and shall be collected, privilege taxes for the
privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this state to
be determined by the application of rates against gross proceeds of sales or gross
income or values, as the case may be. as' provided in the following sections.
Miss. Code Ann. § 10105 (1942) (emphasis added), amended by Miss. Code Ann. § 27-65-13
(Supp. 1972).
Upon every person operating a pipeline, railroad, airplane, bus. truck, or any
other transportation business for the transportation of persons or property for com-
pensation or hire between pohits within thil State, there is hereby levied, assessed, and
shall be collected, a tax equal to five per cent of the gross hicome of such busintess.
Miss. Code Ann. § 10109(2) (1942) (emphasis added), amended by Miss. Code Ann. § 27-65-
19(2) (Supp. 1972).
Although the statutes could be interpreted as reaching both intrastate and interstate coni-
merce, the state showed proof that the tax had been applied only to commercial transactions
occurring within the state. Complete Auto Transit. 430 U.S. at 275 n.2.
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discriminate against interstate commerce, and there is no dan-
ger of interstate commerce being smothered by cumulative
taxes of several states. There is no possibility of any other state
duplicating the tax involved in this case.2 °7
The plaintiff, relying on previous decisions holding that a privilege
tax may not be applied to an activity that is part of interstate commerce,
attacked the validity of the state's tax.2 °8 The United States Supreme
Court, affirming the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling, criticized these
decisions because they did not consider the actual effect of the tax.209
The Court stated that "[t]he rule reflects an underlying philosophy that
interstate commerce should enjoy a sort of 'free trade' immunity from
state taxation."21 Instead, the Court insisted that interstate commerce
must pay its just share of state tax burden. The Court further concluded
that the focus should not be on the formal language of the tax statute but,
rather, on its practical effect.211 In upholding Mississippi's tax, the
Court formulated a new test for judging the validity of state taxes under
the dormant commerce clause. The Court ruled that a tax levied on the
gross sales or receipts of a firm for the privilege of doing business within
the state is constitutional if the tax: (1) is based upon a sufficient nexus
between the state and the activities being taxed; (2) is fairly apportioned;
(3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly
related to the services provided by the state.212
207. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 330 So. 2d 268, 272 (1976) aff'd, 430 U.S. 274
(1977).
208. 430 U.S. at 278; see, e.g., Spector Motor Service, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Freeman, 329
U.S. 249 (1946).
209. 430 U.S. at 285.
210. Id. at 278 (footnote omitted). See Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252. The Court, in formulat-
ing the Complete Auto Transit test of state taxes attempted to fulfill what the Court in Western
Livestock tried to do nearly 40 years before-ensure that businesses conducting interstate oper-
ations pay their fair share of the state tax burden. Arguably, the Complete Auto Transit test,
presently in effect, shares a flaw inherent in the multiple burdens approach of Western Live
Stock. Both tests may lead to overtaxation of interstate commerce since it is difficult to fairly
apportion state taxes upon interstate enterprises.
211. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 (citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Reve-
nue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)); see, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436
(1964); Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Memphis Gas Co. v.
Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.. 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
212. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279; see Simet & Lynn, supra note 174. The nexus
requirement of prong one stems from both the due process clause and the commerce clause. In
light of the Commonwealth Edison decision and the lower court cases following it, it can be
argued that no fourth prong remains in the Complete Auto Transit test. See infra notes 216-33
and accompanying text. Although the Court articulated the "fairly related" requirement in
Complete Auto Transit, it has not actually applied it in subsequent cases such as Common-
wealth Edison. Because, under Commonwealth Edison, presence within the taxing entity's ju-
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Arguably, elements one, two and four of the Complete Auto Transit
test involve strictly due process concerns of reasonableness and fair-
ness.2 13 If these three requirements primarily concern due process, then
only prong three of the Complete Auto Transit test reflects the intent be-
hind the dormant commerce clause.21 4 Under this interpretation of the
test, a non-discriminatory state tax will always pass commerce clause
scrutiny.215
3. Application of the Complete Auto Transit test in Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana
The Complete Auto Transit test was applied by the Supreme Court
in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,16 a case where the state of
Montana imposed a severance tax on coal mined in the state.217 In Com-
monwealth Edison, the tax was calculated "at varying rates depending on
the value, energy content, and method of extraction of the coal," but did
risdiction appears to be the only prerequisite to satisfying the fourth prong, the fourth prong
may be merely an extension of the nexus requirement of prong one.
213. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxa-
tion: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 912 (1985). In
a footnote, Professor Sedler quoted Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207
(1980):
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two requirements
for such state taxation [of the income of a business operating in interstate commerce]:
a "minimal connection" or "nexus" between the interstate activities and the taxing
State, and a "rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the
intrastate values of the enterprise." The tax cannot be out of all appropriate propor-
tion to the business transacted by the [enterprise] in that State.
Id. at 219 (citations omitted). Sedler, supra, at 913 n.l 17.
The difference between the dormant commerce clause and the due process clause was
commented on by Professors Nowak, Rotunda and Young:
The "substantial nexus" portion of the modem commerce clause test is similar to the
due process requirement except that the commerce clause test focuses on the burden
[o]n interstate commerce: while the commerce clause will require that the state or
local tax be fairly apportioned in order to prevent an undue burden on interstate
commerce, the due process clause requires state jurisdiction to tax.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.11, at 289 (1986).
Professor Sedler suggests that Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (4-4 decision), should more properly have been decided on due
process rather than negative commerce clause grounds. Sedler, supra, at 913 n. 117.
214. Sedler, supra note 213, at 913.
215. In the decisions following Complete Auto Transit, a non-discriminatory state taxation
of interstate commerce has always been upheld. Id. at 915.
In a footnote, Professor Sedler discussed the Court's different treatment of state taxation
schemes affecting foreign commerce. He proposed that Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), where the Court invalidated a California tax on Japanese cargo
on dormant commerce clause grounds, should have been based, instead, on a federal foreign
policy rationale. Sedler, supra note 213, at 915-16 n.130.
216. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
217. Id. at 612-13.
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not fluctuate according to the amount of coal extracted.2 8
In 1978, four Montana coal producers filed suit in Montana state
court seeking a declaration that the tax was invalid under the supremacy
and commerce clauses of the federal Constitution. Reviewing a decision
from the Montana Supreme Court that found the tax unconstitutional,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the focus in deciding a com-
merce clause challenge to a state severance tax should be on the tax's
practical effect rather than on whether the state tax is levied on goods
prior to their entry into interstate commerce. 219 The Court noted that a
state has a right to fair payment for state-provided services.2 2
Consequently, Justice Marshall, writing for the Commonwealth
Edison majority, held that the Montana tax must be properly evaluated
under the four-part test outlined in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.22' The Montana tax clearly satisfied the first two prongs of the
test. The coal companies, however, asserted that the tax violated the last
two requirements.222 The third prong was violated, the coal companies
argued because the Montana tax discriminated against businesses en-
gaged in interstate commerce; 80% of Montana coal was shipped out-of-
state.223 The Court disposed of this argument by stating that "the Mon-
tana tax [was] computed at the same rate regardless of the final destina-
tion of the coal .... 224 The fourth part of the test was violated, the coal
companies asserted, because the tax was not fairly related to any services
provided by the state.225 However, under the Court's reasoning, the
mere presence of a taxed entity within the state was sufficient to satisfy
this part of the Complete Auto Transit test.226 Hence, the Court declined
218. Id. at 613. A tax on the value, the energy content or the method of extraction of the
coal could not be easily related to services provided by the state as could a tax varying with the
amount of coal mined. Lacking a measurable connection between the state tax and state-
provided services present in a user fee situation, the Court in Commonwealth Edison could not
determine if the state's severance tax was "fairly related" to state-provided services. Mon-
tana's severance tax on coal was thus summarily upheld.
219. Id. at 614-16.
220. Id. at 616 (quoting Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Washington Steve-
doring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978)).
221. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
222. 453 U.S. at 617.
223. Id. at 618.
224. Id. at 619.
225. Id. at 625-26.
226. Id. at 623; see also Note, supra note 178, at 688-92.
According to this commentator, the Court employed a three-step analysis to justify Mon-
tana's severance tax under the fourth requirement of the Compleie Auto Transit test. Roughly,
this analysis was: (1) The Court focused on the fact that the due process clause does not
require that "the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity ... be
reasonably related to the value of the services provided." The Court argued that this premise
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to conduct a hearing on the "fairly related" prong of the Complete Auto
Transit test, choosing to defer to the superior fact-finding capabilities of
the legislature.227
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, dissented,
stating that the majority incorrectly based its decision upon the issue of
"whether the measure of the tax is fixed as a percentage of the value of
the coal taken." '228 Justice Blackmun argued that under the majority's
line of reasoning, "[n]o trial will ever be necessary on the issue of fair
relationship so long as a State is careful to impose a proportional rather
than a fiat tax rate.
229
Even Justice White, in his concurring opinion, stated: "[t]his is a
very troublesome case for me, and I join the Court's opinion with consid-
erable doubt and with the realization that Montana's levy on consumers
in other States may in the long run prove to be an intolerable and unac-
ceptable burden on commerce. '230 Despite strong reasons for striking
down Montana's tax, the Court, recognizing its lack of competency to
make decisions in this area,23' stated that the "rate of taxation is essen-
tially a matter for legislative, and not judicial, resolution. 2 32 The Court
holds true even when the tax is evaluated under a commerce clause analysis; (2) The Court
viewed the fourth prong ("fairly related") of the test as merely an extension of the first ("sub-
stantial nexus"). Therefore, the tax need only be assessed according to a taxpayer's presence in
the state rather than on the value of the services provided by the state; (3) The Court deferred
to the legislature to make the final decision since it is better equipped and uses a majoritarian
decision-making process. Note, supra note 178, at 688-89; see also 125 P. KURLAND & G.
CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1980 TERM SUPPLEMENT 1, 126-30 (1982) (argument that
Complete Auto Transit test's "fairly related" requirement should have at least received hearing
in Commonwealth Edison).
227. 453 U.S. at 626.
228. Id. at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent further argued that "[u]nder the Court's
reasoning any ad valorem tax will satisfy the fourth prong; indeed, the Court implicitly ratifies
Montana's contention that it is free to tax this coal at 100% or even 1,000% of value should it
choose to do so." Id. at 645-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Professor Levmore has suggested that "[t]he exploitation thus permitted by the Court's
decision [in Montana] is the most harmful sort of state action involved in the commerce clause
cases." Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 618
(1983).
230. 453 U.S. at 637 (White, J., concurring).
231. See Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935).
232. 453 U.S. at 627. See McGrath & Hellerstein, Reflections on Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana, 43 MONT. L. REV. 165, 171-72 (1982); see generally L. TRIlE, supra note 17,
§ 5-22, at 310 n.13 (Congress is most appropriate body to determine relative allocation of
powers between national and state governments).
Although in most cases a state tax should be set by the legislature, exceptions remain.
For a discussion that Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana was wrongly decided see Note,
supra note 178. The author of this Note argued that deference to the state legislature is im-
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noted that under our federal system the proper level of state taxes must
first be determined by state legislatures and then, if necessary, by
Congress.
2 33
The trend has been for a court to defer to the legislature when faced
with a difficult decision in the business/economic realm. The ruling in
Commonwealth Edison allowing the legislative branch to determine the
proper level of a state severance tax is just one example of this policy.
The message sent by the Court is this: if the political process functions
adequately in a given area, the Court will defer to the legislature's
judgment.
Presently, the Court analyzes dormant commerce clause challenges
to state taxes under the four-part test outlined in Complete Auto Transit.
However, in a subsequent case, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
proper for state taxes of energy-producing resources moved in interstate commerce. When a
state can fill its own coffers at the expense of out-of-state consumers, resulting legislation will
be slanted in the state's favor. Id. at 697. In the case of a severance tax on an in-state natural
resource such as in Commonwealth Edison, a court must step in to set the proper level of the
tax. The author of this Note proposed a manageable standard of review for courts to follow.
First, because the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test only states that taxes
must be "fairly related" to the benefits provided by the state, a court need not determine that
the tax paid exactly equals the cost of services provided. Id. at 699. "Hence, there need only
be an ascertainable 'relationship,' and that relationship must be one which 'fairly' burdens the
taxpayer; only approximation, not mathematical precision, is called for." Id. at 699-700.
Before proceeding with his or her case, the plaintiff must prove that the state tax is levied
on goods "(1) moved in interstate commerce, (2) used primarily by nonresidents of the taxing
state, and (3) subject to monopoly-like control by that state." Id. at 700. If this prima facie
case is not established an irrebuttable presumption that the challenged tax is actually fairly
related to the state-provided services results. Id. at 700-01. Assuming that this burden of
production is met the plaintiff may attempt to show that the challenged tax is excessive in
relation to services provided. Rough approximation is all that is necessary at this stage. If the
taxpayer succeeds in demonstrating that the tax appears unduly burdensome, the burden of
production shifts to the state. The state need only show that it has made a good faith attempt
to fairly set the rate of the tax. Id. at 701-02. The court's scrutiny should be on "the process
leading to the challenged result, not the result itself.... The court would, in effect, defer to the
political process, reviewing taxes only to the extent necessary to prevent commerce clause
violations when that process is ineffective." Id. at 702; see also Note, supra note 168, at 452-
54; Note, An Outline for Development of Cost-Based State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 913, 922-29 (1980).
233. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 628; see also South Carolina Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 191 (1938). The Barnwell Court stated: "courts are not any the
more entitled, because interstate commerce is affected, to substitute their own for the legisla-
tive judgment." Id. In the case of a state tax on an energy resource being used predominately
by out-of-state consumers, the state legislature may be biased in favor of state interests. Even
though in this case Congress would be the most appropriate body to set the tax rate, problems
may arise. Congress is notoriously slow to act and, arguably, a court should rule on the consti-
tutionality of the state tax as an interim measure. This way interstate business would not be
penalized by an unconstitutionally high tax during the period between the enactment of the tax
and the passage of a congressional bill setting a fair tax rate.
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tana,2 34 the Court declined to even apply the fourth prong of the Com-
plete Auto Transit test-that the state tax be fairly related to state-
provided services. Thus, today, state taxes which are questioned under
the fairly related requirement of the Complete Auto Transit test are auto-
matically upheld by the Court in deference to the superior ability of the
legislative branch to decide the proper level of local taxes.
B. Analysis
1. Santa Monica's franchise fee under dormant commerce clause
analysis
a. proper role of the court in determining constitutionality of Santa
Monica's franchise fee
Had the court in Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica 235 ruled that
the market participant doctrine did not apply, the City of Santa Monica's
franchise fee would have been subject to the Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady236 test for state taxes. Such a holding would have led to the
question of whether, under the fairly related prong of the Complete Auto
Transit test, the court or the state legislature is the proper body to deter-
mine the level of the franchise fee. Either body, however, is faced with
the difficulty of choosing the proper criteria to judge the validity of the
franchise fee. If a court performs this task, should it limit itself to a
simple yes or no inquiry under the requirements of the dormant com-
merce clause? Or should the court go further and actually determine the
exact dollar amount of the fee?
Various arguments can be made that a court should decide if the
City of Santa Monica's franchise fee is properly set.237 First, it can be
asserted that judicial intervention is necessary to ensure that a fixed
charge such as Santa Monica's is not simply a guise for otherwise imper-
missible activity. Second, if the court does rule on the fairly related na-
ture of the city's franchise fee the court will send a message to other cities
234. 453 U.S. 607 (1981).
235. No. CV 82-2362 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1986).
236. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
237. Perhaps the courts should have greater power to decide economic issues. Alexis De
Tocqueville, the French scholar who observed American democracy in the mid 1800's noted:
In America the legislature of each state is faced by no power capable of resisting it.
Nothing can check its progress, neither privileges, nor local immunities, nor personal
influence, nor even the authority of reason, for it represents the majority, which
claims to be the unique organ of reason. So its own will sets the sole limits to its
action.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 89 (G. Lawrence Trans. Anchor Books ed.
1969).
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that an excessive tax may be struck down. These other cities will then be
more cautious in calculating their franchise fees, making sure that a fair
and quantifiable relationship exists between the services they provide and
reimbursing taxes. Finally, even if a court rules on the validity of the
connection between services provided and taxes assessed, congressional
action is not precluded. Congress can always override a judicial decision
invalidating a state tax on dormant commerce clause grounds by ex-
pressly removing the tax from the restrictions of the commerce clause.
2 38
In upholding Santa Monica's franchise fee, Judge Kelleher relied
heavily upon the ruling in Western Oil & Gas Association v. Gory.239 In
Cory, the state of California had placed two distinct types of fees on oil
pipelines running beneath state-owned land. One fee was based on the
volume of oil actually passing through the pipeline while the other was
based on a percentage of the appraised value of the land through which
the pipelines ran.2 "- The Cory court struck down the first fee because it
was disproportionate to the benefits conferred upon the oil companies
who owned the pipelines.2 41 The court was able to do this because the
fee was based on volume-it measured actual use and, therefore, could be
compared to benefits received by the oil companies.242 Conversely, the
second fee was allowed to stand. z4 3 Presumably the court in Cory, rely-
ing upon the holding of Commonwealth Edison, reasoned that the court
did not have the resources to measure the constitutionality of a fee levied
for services which could not be easily measured. 2 "
238. "Given their origin as negative judicial inferences from a constitutional grant of power
to Congress, the Supreme Court's doctrinal limitations on state interference are always subject
to congressional revision." L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-2, at 321. See Prudential Life Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). In PrudentialLife, Congress had passed the McCarren Act
which provided that "silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." Id. at 429. The
Court in Prudential Life held that the McCarren Act exempted a South Carolina tax on only
out-of-state insurance companies even though this tax would otherwise not have survived judi-
cial review under the dormant commerce clause.
239. 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (4-4 decision).
240. 726 F.2d at 1341-42.
241. Id. at 1344-45.
242. Id. at 1344. The court stated that the fee based on volume was not justifiable as a
means of compensating the state for: (1) improvements to the land, (2) services or facilities, or
(3) environmental damage caused by the use of the pipelines. The court held that the fee
violated the commerce clause because it was a disguised revenue raising measure. For cases
concerning "user" fees designed to reimburse the state for the use of state-owned or state-
provided transportation or other facilities and services, see Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S.
583 (1939); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937).
243. 726 F.2d at 1343-45.
244. The Cory court never discussed the validity of the percentage fees one way or the
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The policy behind the decisions in Cory and Commonwealth Edison
also applies to the facts in Shell. A court is ill-equipped to determine
whether a fixed charge such as Santa Monica's franchise fee actually re-
imburses the city only for services it provides. Also, the wording of the
Complete Auto Transit test, i.e., whether the tax is fairly related to state-
provided services, is sufficiently ambiguous to deny a court any meaning-
ful guidelines. Deference to the state legislature or Congress is the
proper choice for a court in this situation.245
other. Judge Kelleher, in Shell, pointed out what he thought would have been the inevitable
result had the Cory court reached the issue. See Shell, No. CV 82-2362 at 9, 11.
245. Such deference may be an outgrowth of the Court's tendency in recent years to abstain
from judicial intervention in purely economic affairs. In United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court declared that it would uphold a regulation dealing with eco-
nomic matters against substantive due process attack if there were any rational basis for the
law. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955). The Court has also removed business' shield from legislation in the
dormant commerce clause area:
In the absence of such legislation the judicial function, under the commerce clause as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the inquiry whether the state legisla-
ture in adopting regulations such as the present has acted within its province, and
whether the means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938). See id. at
184-85 n.2; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) for footnotes dis-
cussing the importance of a system of internal political restraints. This deference extends also
to actions taken by Congress in its capacity to make laws necessary and proper to regulate
commerce. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (child labor banned pursuant to
federal statute); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (unfair labor prac-
tices held illegal pursuant to National Labor Relations Act).
This policy of judicial abstention does not extend to all non-economic affairs, however.
Justice Stone's famous footnote four in Carolene Products was later used as justification for the
Court's ability to strike down laws affecting racial minorities, aliens and other classes not
adequately represented in the political process. 304 U.S. at 149 n.4. See Lusky, Footnote
Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982); Powell,
Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
In the commerce clause context, the Court tends not to interfere with a state legislative
scheme if all parties have access to proper representation in the political process. Thus, the
Court emphasizes the non-discrimination aspect of the dormant commerce clause analysis; if a
disproportionate percentage of those affected are out-of-staters, then the normal system of leg-
islative checks and balances does not operate.
If the local measure, even under the guise of a more recent legitimate goal, attempts
to afford residents an economic advantage at the expense of a free-flowing national
market, the countervailing national interest will override. But even local economic
measures are more likely to be upheld if there is no discriminatory purpose or effect.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 163, § 8.9, at 286. See Milk Control Bd. v.
Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306 U.S. 346 (1939) (Pennsylvania law setting minimum price for milk
shipped in interstate commerce upheld because local consumers were equally burdened and
thus political check on law existed).
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the superior fact-finding ability of Congress
extends to many areas of constitutional adjudication. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (deference to Congress' finding that particular federal spending program was necessary
to remedy past discrimination); City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (deference to Con-
January 1988] DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Another policy reason for permitting the legislature to decide this
issue is that oil franchise rates are not of great importance on an isolated
basis. However, if more cities decide to follow Santa Monica's exam-
ple,z46 the problem could be construed as statewide in magnitude and the
legislature might be justified in acting.247 Even assuming that other cities
choose not to adopt sufficiently oppressive fees to trigger statewide ac-
tion, the importance of encouraging the construction and maintenance of
oil pipelines might provide an adequate reason for the legislature to pass
such laws. Specifically, such legislation would invite the oil companies to
build large inter-city pipelines without the fear that one city might later
thwart the viability of the project. Also, the legislature is free to consider
the economic efficiency of not allowing municipalities the power to force
additional pipelines to be built to compensate for segments of existing
gress' decision to enact Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966) (deference to Congress' decision to enact § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which,
in effect, gave immigrants from Puerto Rico the right to vote in New York City).
246. See supra note 12. The City of Santa Monica's increased franchise fee is arguably a
method to ensure that pipelines are routed outside of the city. The situation in Shell can be
analogized to the "fight between the haves and the have-nots" over Occidental Petroleum's
proposed drilling project in the Pacific Palisades. Robertson, Palisades Oil is Los Angeles' Oil-
Go for itl, L.A. Times, Aug. 9, 1987, Pt. V (Opinion), at 5, col. 1. In this editorial, William
Robertson, the executive secretary-treasurer of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor,
asserted that:
the Palisades is the only area in [Los Angeles] where known oil reserves are not being
produced for the benefit of all. Opponents have long enjoyed the economic benefits
of safe urban drilling in other parts of the city, but when it comes to producing oil
reserves in the Palisades, they want no part of it, however safe or environmentally
sound.
Id. Similarly, citizens of Santa Monica drive cars and depend upon petroleum-derived prod-
ucts in other ways. Perhaps it is only fair that Santa Monica does its share to assist in the
transportation and production of oil.
247. The permanent nature of oil pipelines complicates the analysis. It can be argued that
municipalities should be allowed to set the rate of local income taxes because different tax
levels merely add to the "competitive advantages and disadvantages ... inherent in the exist-
ence of separate local entities ...." Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CAt.wI. L
REv. 1055, 1099-1102 (1972). Thus, a business dissatisfied with the tax rates in one city can
simply redirect its focus to another city.
Oil pipelines may deserve special consideration because of the manner in which'they are
installed. It costs a great deal of money to dig up an oil pipeline and reroute it. Conceivably
cities will be able to charge franchise fees up to the level of this removal cost. To avoid this
type of unfair overtaxation the legislature may want to impose limits upon oil pipeline
franchise fees.
At the same time, however, cities such as Santa Monica can claim that there is no method
to accurately determine a franchise fee which will adequately compensate the city for unfore-
seen dangers. The possibility that pipeline explosions or other less noticeable health hazards
may occur provides an excellent reason to err on the side of overcharging for a pipeline
franchise.
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pipelines shut down because of fee disputes.2 48
Despite the real danger that cities will enact fixed fees in order to
avoid the constitutional restraints imposed upon user fees measuring ac-
tual use, the decisions in Complete Auto Transit and the cases following it
remain valid. First, if a local governmental body obviously levied a tax
for the purpose of protecting local economic interests, the tax would be
struck down on commerce clause grounds. 249 Second, assuming that the
tax is a legitimate exercise of a city's power, a court should not be forced
to determine the fairness of the tax.
Ideally, a judge could wave a magic wand and conjure up the precise
rate of a fair tax. Realistically, however, courts these days have difficulty
hearing the easy cases; complex tax decisions such as the one presented
in Shell belong in the legislative branch of government. In our system of
government, courts require greater guidance when making decisions than
does the legislature. Given the nature of the issue in Shell, no prior judi-
cial rulings would be able to provide an adequate framework for future
decisions. Because a fair franchise fee in a Shell-type situation is neces-
sarily subjective, each court faced with a challenged municipal fee would
have to resort to an ad hoe decision-making process. A better approach
would be to wait for the legislature to pass a blanket rule applying to all
oil pipeline franchise fees. Should debate arise over the interpretation or
constitutionality of such a statute, then a court would be justified in step-
ping in to resolve the issue.
The facts in Shell do not indicate that the effectiveness of the polit-
ical decision-making process would be diminished. In Commonwealth
Edison, where the process arguably was damaged, the Montana legisla-
ture did not have any incentive to limit its severance tax on coal because
most of the burden fell on out-of-state consumers. By contrast, under the
Shell facts the state legislature would be representing not only the cities
which have pipelines running through their property and which want the
discretion to raise their rental fees, but also the consumers of oil in Cali-
fornia cities without pipelines.250 In addition, the oil companies can
248. For an argument that economic efficiency arguments do not apply to judicial rulings
under the dormant commerce clause see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
249. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (New York state law discriminating against
out-of-state milk suppliers).
250. Because oil is the lifeblood of American industry, a great deal of thought has been
given to public policy in this area:
It is possible to stipulate three general requisites of any public policy toward crude oil
pipelines:
(1) Acknowledging the existence of long-, intermediate-, and short-run decreasing
costs in the operation of pipe lines, any acceptable public policy toward pipe lines
must include provisions designed to achieve the social optimum of lowest cost per
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lobby effectively in Sacramento and Washington, D.C.2 5 1 Because any
regulation or tax will not affect out-of-state residents to a disproportion-
ate degree over in-state residents, the majoritarian decision-making pro-
cess will not be inhibited. If a regulation or tax passed by the legislature
did appear to overtly favor in-state interests,252 then scrutiny by a court
under the dormant commerce clause might be warranted.
b. balancing dormant commerce clause challenges to state taxes
Historically, the United States Supreme Court developed two dis-
tinct lines of dormant commerce clause analysis: one for state taxes and
one for state regulations. 3 In Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica,254
the City of Santa Monica's franchise fee would have been best analyzed
using a tax analysis although a regulation analysis might also have ap-
plied. However, even under the dormant commerce clause test of state
unit by encouraging the construction of the largest possible lines in any particular
area. Because of the uneconomic higher costs (and therefore wasted resources)
which arise from carrying oil in small quantities, any policy must be rejected if it
encourages the construction of several small lines where one large line could be used.
(2) All companies desiring access to the lines should have the right there to both
initially and permanently guaranteed, in order that there can be no valid grounds for
charges that the owners of the lines use them to control the producing and/or refin-
ing stages of the industry. Not only should there be guaranteed access, there should
also be equalized costs for all companies using the lines.
(3) These two goals of any pipe-line public policy should be achieved with the least
possible amount of regulatory effort. Indeed, should appreciable regulation be neces-
sary, it would become necessary to balance the social desirability of least-cost opera-
tion and equal access against the undesirability of regulation.
L. COOKENBOO, CRUDE OIL PIPELINES AND COMPETITION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 128
(1955).
251. Shifting the decision-making authority to the state legislature is a simple solution only
from the court's viewpoint. Even though the legislature is better equipped than the court to
undertake a detailed factual analysis of the problem, the legislature still requires a decisional
framework. Possibly the state legislature could expand upon the "fairly related" requirement
of the Complete Auto Transit test by performing the fact-finding necessary to determine what a
"fair" fee is. The legislature could take the user fee and tax cases as a starting point but would
not be limited to a strictly constitutional analysis, as a court is. See generally Metropolitan
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935) (Congress does not have the
same limitations on its decision-making process as the courts). What is "fair" for a court does
not necessarily equal what is "fair" for a legislature. The Supreme Court clearly indicated in
the cases following Complete Auto Transit that legislatures are essentially free from dormant
commerce clause restraints when deciding the proper level of a state tax. See supra note 215.
252. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (195 1) (local statute discriminat-
ing against out-of-state milk producers struck down because of availability of less discrimina-
tory alternatives).
253. The analysis used in challenges to state regulations under the dormant commerce
clause could possibly apply to challenges to state taxes as well. L. TRIBE, supra note 17. § 6-
14, at 344, 345 n.3.
254. No. CV 82-2362 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1987).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:581
regulations, Santa Monica's franchise fee probably would have passed
judicial scrutiny.
The dormant commerce clause test for challenged state taxes and
the dormant commerce clause test for state regulations both involve due
process and commerce clause concerns. The first two prongs of the Com-
plete Auto Transit test for state taxes-(1) that there be a sufficient nexus
between the state and the taxed activities; and (2) that the tax be fairly
apportioned-are related primarily to due process concerns of fairness
and reasonableness. 255 The establishment of this minimum contact be-
tween the taxing state and the taxed entity ensures that businesses con-
ducting interstate commerce will not be subject to taxes by states with
which they have little or no connection. 6
Arguably, the fourth requirement of the Complete Auto Transit test
was enacted to ensure that commercial enterprises engaged in interstate
commerce exactly compensated state governments for the use of state-
provided services. However, later cases interpreted this fourth require-
ment as merely an outgrowth of the first two prongs.2 57 Thus, the bulk
of the Court's present analysis for state taxes challenged under the dor-
mant commerce clause involves due process standards.
The first two prongs of the standard judicial test for state regulations
under the dormant commerce clause, like the test for state taxes, concern
due process. 258 The first requirement of the state regulations test is that
the state have a legitimate purpose for the regulation, 259 and the second
requirement is that there be a rational relationship between the law and
this state purpose.26° Apparently, the first, second and fourth prongs of
the Complete Auto Transit test for state taxes are roughly equivalent to
the first two requirements of the standard test of state regulations under
the dormant commerce clause. The emphasis in each case is on a certain
required level of reasonableness underlying the state tax or regulation to
comport with the due process clause.
Both the non-discrimination requirements of the Complete Auto
Transit test for state taxes and the test for state regulations reflect the
commerce clause policy of equal treatment of in-state and out-of-state
interests. The third prong of the Complete Auto Transit analysis asks
255. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause, supra note 213, at 912-13.
256. Id.
257. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. 609, Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984). See Note,
supra note 178, at 683.
258. For an outline of the dormant commerce clause test for state regulations, see supra
note 51.
259. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190.
260. Id.
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that the state tax not discriminate against interstate commerce while the
fourth requirement of the standard state regulations test questions
whether the state has used the least discriminatory alternative. The ra-
tionale behind either test is to ensure that local businesses do not enjoy a
state-enforced advantage over out-of-state enterprises conducting inter-
state operations.261
The balancing requirement of the dormant commerce clause test for
state regulations, a major element of that test, is absent from the Com-
plete Auto Transit test for state taxes.262 One explanation for the absence
of a balancing of state benefits and commercial burdens is that the United
States Supreme Court has pre-balanced the conflicting interests in a tax
situation. Perhaps, this definitional balancing has led to a test which can
be applied to all cases falling in the same category as opposed to ad hoc
balancing where the interests are weighed on a case by case basis. For
instance, in the free speech area, certain types of offensive words have
been deemed by the Court to be "of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality. ' 263 Under a defini-
tional balancing approach, these words are assumed to be subject to prior
restraints by the state while prior restraints on other classes of words
have to be decided individually.
In the state tax cases, the state's interest is always the same: com-
pensation for state-provided goods or services. Likewise, on the other
side of the scale, the burdens upon entities conducting interstate opera-
tions remain constant. These burdens upon interstate commerce are the
261. For an argument that both the Complete Auto Transit test for state taxes and the
dormant commerce clause test for state regulations are conceptually justified only upon the
nondiscrimination aspect of the dormant commerce clause, see Sedler, supra note 213.
262. There is a fifth prong to the dormant commerce clause test for state regulations:
whether the state law has an extraterritorial effect. The state tax's most serious extraterritorial
effect would likely result from an improperly apportioned tax. See Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (New York law that prohibited
liquor distributors from selling liquor in other states at a lower price than in New York vio-
lated dormant commerce clause); see also supra note 51. Compliance with the second and
third prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test would probably eliminate any adverse effects of
the tax outside of the taxing jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 212.
The franchise fee in Shell did not have the effect outside of the state that the New York
law in Brown-Forman had. Santa Monica's actions in Shell did not regulate out-of-state trans-
actions because the taxed activity in Shell took place entirely within the state. The extraterri-
torial effect test was designed to prevent one state from regulating activity in another state;
even if the transportation of Shell's oil through the pipeline is assumed to be interstate com-
merce, no state outside of California is effected to the degree necessary to trigger the test used
in Brown-Forman.
263. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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danger of overtaxation and the hindrance to interstate commerce caused
by the efforts necessary to collect the taxes-the compliance factor. Be-
cause the relative weight of the interests on both sides of the balance
remain much the same in all tax cases, an ad hoc balancing of the inter-
ests is not required in individual tax cases. Thus, the Court's test of state
taxes as delineated in Complete Auto Transit concentrates only on
whether the taxed entity has sufficient contacts with the taxing state to
satisfy due process concerns, and whether the discrimination proscribed
by the dormant commerce clause is absent. The ad hoc balancing per-
formed in the normal dormant commerce clause test of state regulations
is not needed where state taxes are concerned because the balance would
not vary substantially with each case.2"
Even if the City of Santa Monica's franchise fee in Shell was scruti-
nized under the dormant commerce clause test for state regulations, the
fee would probably be upheld. Santa Monica's franchise fee would easily
pass the first two prongs of the state regulations analysis; these two
prongs comprise a due process rational basis test which is very deferen-
tial to the state's interests. Santa Monica arguably has several legitimate
reasons for enacting its fee upon Shell's oil pipeline. Included among
these reasons are: (1) concern for the health and safety of Santa Monica
citizens, and (2) the right to compensation for city-provided services.
The franchise fee is rationally related to the first reason because the in-
creased revenues might discourage the oil company from renewing the
franchise, thereby eliminating the potential danger of pipeline explosion.
The franchise fee is rationally related to the second reason because the
increased revenues would pay for past and future city services. Santa
Monica's franchise fee would also pass muster under the requirement
that the state use the least discriminatory alternative. Under Santa
Monica's franchise fee both intrastate and interstate oil pipelines were
treated identically.
265
The satisfaction of these three prongs would leave only the balanc-
ing of state and commercial interests element. In Shell, the franchise fee
would still have been upheld even if Santa Monica's interest in gaining
compensation for city-provided services was outweighed by the tax bur-
den upon interstate commerce. A court could not strike down Santa
Monica's franchise fee under a dormant commerce clause balancing test
for two reasons. First, just as a court is not equipped to determine if a
state tax is fairly related to state-provided services as required by the
fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, a court cannot judge the
264. See notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
265. Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 11, at 28.
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level of overtaxation present for purposes of a balancing test. Second,
assuming that the burden upon interstate commerce clearly outweighed
the benefits to Santa Monica, 66 the court should still be reluctant to in-
terfere with cases in the business/economic realm in which none of the
actors historically has been underrepresented in the political process.2 67
In summary, the result in Shell would be identical under either the
Complete Auto Transit tax case approach or the standard test used for
dormant commerce clause challenges to state regulations. Because a
commercial enterprise such as Shell Oil Co. can obtain an adequate voice
in the state legislature or in Congress, the court should not strike down
Santa Monica's franchise fee. Instead of deciding whether the franchise
fee is fairly related to city-provided services under a tax approach or
whether the burden to interstate commerce outweighs the benefits to
Santa Monica under a regulations approach, the court must defer to the
legislative branch.
2. The state legislature and local franchise fees
Judge Kelleher's deferral of the problem of determining the proper
rate of local franchise fees to the state legislature did not solve the di-
lemma; it merely shifted it to another decision-making body. This sec-
tion examines how current California statutes address the oil pipeline
franchise issue and then discusses whether this law applies to the City of
Santa Monica's franchise agreement with Shell Oil Co. 268  Finally, a
266. The courts will use the balancing test in dormant commerce clause cases only where
one interest clearly outweighs the other. If a somewhat equal balance exists between the com-
peting interests, courts generally do not feel comfortable in performing the balancing test.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (state regulation prohibiting operation of
trains exceeding set number of cars violated dormant commerce clause).
Rarely, the courts will perform an additional test when both sides of the balance are
roughly equal. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), the Court
asked whether the state could have accomplished the same result in a less burdensome manner.
This interpretation of the dormant commerce clause balancing requirement makes passing this
part of the test very difficult. Moreover, it is probably equally difficult for a court to decide
whether a state regulation could have accomplished the state's goal in a less burdensome fash-
ion as it is for a court to determine whether a state tax is fairly related to state-provided
services. See notes 204-35 and accompanying text.
267. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 6-5, at 327 & n.7. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (state highway regulation barring most commercial
trucks upheld because intrastate as well as interstate shippers were equally affected).
268. A detailed and comprehensive analysis of California state law involving the oil pipeline
franchise fee issue is beyond the scope of this Note. The purpose of this section is merely to
acquaint the reader with the potential for conflict: (1) between federal and state/local law;
(2) between state and local laws. Although this Note deals mainly with federal law, in particu-
lar the commerce clause, it is wise to remember that federal, state and local laws exist concur-
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modest proposal is offered for model legislation dealing with the
situation.
a. present legislation
Section 6202 of California's Franchise Act of 1937 grants to the leg-
islative body of state municipalities the power to
grant a franchise to any person, firm, or corporation,... to use,
or to lay and use, pipes and appurtenances for transmitting and
distributing oil or products thereof for all purposes,... under,
along, across, or upon the public streets, ways, alleys, and
places within the municipality, upon the terms and conditions
provided in this chapter.269
Under section 6203 of the Act, local decision-making bodies may "in
such a franchise impose such other and additional terms and conditions
not in conflict with this chapter, whether governmental or contractual in
character, as in the judgment of the legislative body are to the public
interest."27 Taken together, sections 6202 and 6203 enable cities and
other state subdivisions to enter into contractual agreements with oil
companies to construct and use oil pipelines running beneath public
streets.
The rate of local franchise fees on oil pipelines is to be calculated in
accordance with section 6231 of the 1937 Act. The pertinent language
reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if the ap-
plication is for a franchise for a nonpublic utility pipeline for
industrial gas or oil or products thereof, the application shall
state that the applicant, if granted the franchise, will pay to the
municipality during the life of the franchise either a specified
percentage agreed to by the applicant and the municipality of
the gross annual receipts of the applicant arising from the use,
operation, or possession of the franchise or an annual franchise
fee in an amount agreed to by the applicant and the municipal-
ity or an annual franchise fee computed by multiplying the sum
of one-half cent ($ 0.005) times the nominal internal diameter
of the pipe, expressed in inches, times the number of lineal feet
of the pipe within the public streets, ways, alleys, or other pub-
rently. An oil pipeline such as the one at issue in Shell is potentially subject to many of these
laws giving rise to both federal and state preemption problems.
269. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 6202 (West Supp. 1987) (the reference to an oil franchise
was added in the 1965 amendment).
270. Id. § 6203 (West 1965).
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lic places within the municipality.271
This statute offers three options for payment for an oil pipeline franchise:
(1) a percentage of gross annual receipts; (2) a negotiated annual fee; and
(3) a predetermined statutory formula. If section 6231 governed Shell
Oil Co.'s franchise for its pipeline running through Santa Monica, only
the last option could apply. The first two payment alternatives depend
upon agreement by both parties-agreement did not occur in Shell.
Under section 6231 the parties' failure to agree upon a percentage of
receipts or an annual fee permits the third option, a savings clause, to
come into force. The franchise fee in Shell, calculated according to op-
tion three, would have been $1029.60 per year.
2 72
This franchise fee calculation from section 6231 would have permit-
ted the City of Santa Monica to levy a mere $1000 annual fee upon
Shell's oil pipeline in the absence of "home rule" in state-local govern-
ment relations.2 73 The home rule approach permits local decision-mak-
ing through provisions in the state constitution.2 74  The California
Constitution grants municipalities designated as charter cities the right to
follow home rule principles.275 In fact, section 6205 of the Franchise Act
271. Id. § 6231 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis omitted).
272. The computation is as follows:
$0.005 X 10 inches X 3.9 miles X 5,280 feet/per mile = $1029.60. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
273. The "home rule" concept in California allows local governments to decide their own
fate regarding matters of strictly local concern. Normally, provisions in the state constitution
delineate not only which local bodies are given home rule, but also under what conditions
these local bodies can exercise home rule. See Vandlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the
United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968).
274. J. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOV'T LAW 70-71 (1975); see generally Januta, The Municipal
Revenue Crisis: California Problems and Possibilities, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1525, 1545-46 (1968):
Peppin, MunicipalHome Rule in California: I, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1941); Peppin, Municipal
Home Rule in California: 11, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 272 (1942); Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in
California: III, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1944); Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California:
IV, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 644 (1946).
275. In California, the state constitution provisions for home rule distinguish between
"state concerns" and "municipal affairs." CAl.. CONST. art. XI, § 5; J. FORDHAM, supra note
274, at 72-73: see Comment, The Mlunicipal Occupational Tax: A Source of Revenue for the
Central City, 10 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 198-202 (1977) (discussion of state preemption).
The inability of courts to adequately make this distinction when deciding which matters are
subject to home rule resembles the problems plaguing courts in other areas. The difference
between state/municipal concerns is often just as nebulous as the local/non-local distinction in
the early state tax cases or the sovereign/proprietary distinction extending to many areas of
constitutional adjudication. See Sato, "Municipal Affairs" ii California, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1055 (1972) (summary of California home rule cases). For a discussion of the local/non-local
distinction, see supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text; of the sovereign/proprietary dis-
tinction, see supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
To reduce the role of the courts in interpreting home rule provisions, Dean Fordham
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of 1937 expressly states that "[t]his chapter does not apply to any munic-
ipality having a freeholder's charter adopted and ratified under the [Cali-
fornia] Constitution and having in such charter provisions for the
issuance of franchises.... 276 Santa Monica is a charter city; the Santa
Monica City Charter has a section dealing with the granting of
franchises,2 77 and, therefore, the city is not governed by the predeter-
mined formula set forth in section 6231.278
Although the Franchise Act of 1937 presently excludes the City of
Santa Monica from the franchise restrictions imposed upon general law
proposed a form of constitutional home rule, referred to as "legislative" home rule. "Under
this form of home rule, the constitution grants local governments all powers the legislature is
capable of delegating, but the legislature is authorized to withdraw or limit home rule powers
by statute." D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH, P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
A FEDERAL SYSTEM 101 (1977). In states which have adopted "legislative" home rule, courts
do not have to decide if the "municipal concern" exception applies to exempt local ordinances
from preemption by state law.
276. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 6205 (West 1965). Section 6205 reflects the State Assem-
bly's intent to permit charter cities to enter into franchise agreements without the constraints
imposed upon general law cities:
[N]othing contained in this chapter shall restrict the right of any such chartered
municipality to avail itself of the provisions of this chapter wherever it may lawfully
do so. The provisions of this chapter relating to the payment of a percentage of gross
receipts shall not be construed as a declaration of legislative judgment as to proper
compensation to be paid a chartered municipality for the right to exercise franchise
privileges therein.
Id.
In fact, the California Supreme Court has specifically declared that "the power to tax for
local purposes clearly is one of the privileges accorded chartered cities by the home rule provi-
sion of the California Constitution." Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 392, 579 P.2d
449, 452, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558, 561 (1978). At the same time, however, the home rule provision
in the California Constitution "contains express language of preemption making local home
rule powers 'subject to general law'" in matters of state-wide concern. D. MANDELKER, D.
NETSCH, P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 104-05
(1983). See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). Therefore, the crucial question is whether a court
will find that a city's oil pipeline franchise fee is a subject of exclusively local or of state-wide
concern.
277. Santa Monica City Charter art. XVI-Franchises. Pertinent parts of this article state:
The City Council is empowered to grant by ordinance a franchise to any person, firm
or corporation ... to use the public streets, ways, alleys and places. . . necessary or
convenient for traversing any portion of the City for the transmitting or conveying of
any service elsewhere. The City Council may prescribe the terms and conditions of
any such grant.
Id. § 1600.
A later part of article XVI prescribes payment terms for such franchises:
[T]he grantee shall.., agree to... [p]ay to the City during the life of the franchise, a
percentage, to be specified in the grant, of the gross annual receipts of the grantee
within the limits of the City, or such other compensation as the City Council may
prescribe in the grant.
Id. § 1605(e).
278. See The Pines v. City of Santa Monica, 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr.
336 (1981).
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cities, the State Assembly conceivably may decide to override Santa
Monica's franchise fee.2 7 9 By making explicit its intention to govern con-
tractual arrangements concerning oil pipelines running through Califor-
nia charter cities, the Legislature could expressly preempt charter city oil
pipeline franchise fees.28°
b. proposal for state legislation
The California State Assembly could take two possible courses of
279. It is not entirely clear, however, that the state legislature has this power. Under the
charter city provisions of the California Constitution, the State Assembly may regulate only
matters in charter cities which are of statewide concern or of shared state and local concern.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5. Anything of a strictly local nature is reserved to the city council or
its equivalent. The problem is that "no exact definition of the phrase 'municipal affairs' can be
formulated." 45 CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities § 99, at 172 (1978).
The most satisfactory general definition of local affairs is limited to statements such as,
" 'municipal affairs' has reference to the internal business affairs of a city." Id. at 173 (citing
Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 58 P. 923 (1899); Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal. 2d 804,
306 P.2d 453 (1957); Griffin v. Los Angeles, 134 Cal. App. 763, 26 P.2d 655 (1933)). The state
legislature influences the courts' decision whether a particular activity is of municipal or state-
wide concern because judges look to legislative intent. However, the final decision on this
matter is left to the courts. "[T]he legislature is empowered neither to determine what consti-
tutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern." 45
CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities § 99, at 174 (1978) (citing Bishop v. San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460
P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969)).
The local/statewide status of inter-city oil pipelines has not been decided by the courts
although secondary use of streets for poles and telephone wires has been held to be a municipal
concern. Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 282, 118 P. 796, 803-04 (1911).
Therefore, a state law designed to regulate the levels of oil pipeline franchise agreements in
charter cities would arguably be valid.
280. See In re Carol Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962) and Pipoly
v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942) for cases dealing with California statutes that
failed to expressly preempt local law. See generally J. FORDHAM, supra note 274, at 87-88.
The obvious legal challenge to state legislation preempting local franchise fees or taxes on
oil pipelines would be that such legislation involves an area not of state-wide concern. Matters
which are truly municipal in scope are reserved under the California Constitution to local
decision-making bodies. Januta, supra note 274, at 1545. Because federal statutes are not
subject to being overridden by local ordinances in areas of purely "municipal concern," a law
passed by Congress would have little problem preempting Santa Monica's franchise fee ordi-
nance. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (no
immunity from federal legislation for state activity in areas of traditional state governmental
functions).
A related issue is whether the City of Santa Monica, faced with state or federal law pur-
porting to regulate the oil pipeline franchise fee, could refuse to renew the franchise altogether.
The City may be able to refuse to deal with Shell based on the fact that the existing pipeline is
environmentally hazardous and poses a potential threat to human life. Although state or fed-
eral law may govern Santa Monica's franchise fee in the event the City decides to enter into
such a contractual relationship, it is debatable that state or federal law can compel a city to
enter into a franchise agreement. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text. The issue has not
been litigated, but is likely to arise if legislation preempting Santa Monica's franchise fee agree-
ment passes.
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action to make the franchise fees of charter cities more uniform. The
first is simply to extend the general law contained in section 6231 of the
Franchise Act of 1937 to charter cities. A second alternative would be to
enact a new law aimed specifically at municipal oil pipeline franchise fees
in cities following home rule. In either case, this legislation should ex-
pressly preempt local laws.281
A modem statute designed to compensate municipalities and, simul-
taneously, not dangerously overtax oil companies should include two fac-
tors. First, the statute should automatically account for inflation by
factoring in one or several national or regional indexes.282 Second, a ceil-
ing should be added to the statute to ensure that a certain, egregious level
of taxation is not reached.28 3
281. Express preemption is preferred because it leaves no doubt as to the legislature's inten-
tion. However, in the absence of such language, legislation may also preempt by implication,
Three tests are used to determine whether the subject of a local law has been impliedly pre-
empted by state-wide legislation:
(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to
clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the sub-
ject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to
indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional
local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and
the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.
Galvan v. Superior Ct., 70 Cal. 2d 851, 859-60, 452 P.2d 930, 935-36, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647-
48 (1969) (listing the three tests established in In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d
809, 814-15, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398-99 (1964)); see generally California Restaurant Ass'n v.
City of Los Angeles, 192 Cal. App. 3d 405, 237 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1987) (local ordinance requir-
ing posting of health warnings at places where alcoholic beverages are sold held not to be
preempted by state law).
Depending upon the state legislature's intent, it might be wise to add to a state law pur-
porting to regulate oil pipeline franchise fees words such as: "This legislation expressly
preempts any and all local laws including those enacted by charter law cities dealing with oil
pipeline franchise fees," or "this legislation occupies the field of oil pipeline franchise fees in
this state including those enacted by charter law cities." See Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in
California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1098-99 for discussion of a case where the legislature had
declared that the state had preempted the field of sales and use taxes by the enactment of the
state Sales and Use Tax law.
282. Using an index to account for inflation is a good idea even if cities themselves set the
fees. The Los Angeles City Council recently voted to double the fees it charges for operating
underground oil pipelines, making its franchise fee "the highest charged in Southern California
.... The 100 percent increase will boost the revenue the city earns from its 42 pipeline
franchises, which cover 510 miles of underground oil pipelines citywide, to $2 million a year."
L.A. Council Doubles Fees on Oil Pipelines, The Evening Outlook (Santa Monica, Cal.), July
16, 1987, at A3, col. 1. In addition to doubling its franchise fees, the L.A. City Council has
factored inflation into the calculation. "The new fee structure is based on a complicated
formula that also takes into consideration rises in the Producers Price Index." Id.
283. If the state legislature drafts the statute to permit a franchise fee to be set according to
the value of the land the pipeline occupies, some guidelines may be necessary. Such a statute
would be a viable compromise between inflexible legislation which does not allow any local
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V. CONCLUSION
Courts should abstain from deciding whether a city's actions fall
under the market participant doctrine or whether local taxes are fair
under the dormant commerce clause. The arbitrary choice of whether to
categorize a state's activity as governmental or as essentially private is
one best kept out of the courts' hands. Because the sovereign/proprie-
tary distinction has proved unworkable in many other areas, it has no
place in determining a state's exemption from dormant commerce clause
scrutiny.
Similarly, the proper level of a state's tax is a decision that a court
should not be asked to make. Instead of deciding whether a local oil
pipeline franchise fee is fairly related to city-provided services, a court
should defer, first, to the state legislature and then, if necessary, to
Congress.
Kenneth T. Fong*
Editor's note: After this Note was sent to the printer, the Ninth
Circuit handed down its decision in Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa
Monica. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 23,
1987, (D.A.R.), at 7854. The Ninth Circuit held that the market partici-
pant doctrine did not shield the City of Santa Monica from dormant
commerce clause analysis. The Circuit Court compared the situation in
Shell to that in Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th
Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 81 (1985) (4-4 decision): "However, like Cory,
this case involves lands held in a sovereign capacity that are recognized
transportation corridors for commerce." L.A. Daily J., Oct. 23, 1987,
(D.A.R.), at 7856.
When the Ninth Circuit reached the dormant commerce clause
analysis, it decided that the city's franchise fee was a user fee rather than
a tax. Therefore, the dormant commerce clause tax analysis used in this
Note did not apply. Id. at 7861 n.8. Because the franchise fee was based
on an evenhanded formula using the value of land abutting the pipeline,
the court upheld Santa Monica's franchise fee. Id. at 7857.
Shell plans to appeal the Ninth Circuit's ruling to the United States
Supreme Court.
variations and no regulation at all. For example, the statute could list various factors which
the local decision-making body must consider when setting the fee. These factors could in-
clude the method to be used to determine the value of the property at issue.
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, Tom and Bonnie Fong, who have always given
me their love and support.
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